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This dispute concerns the policy of immigration en-
forcement discretion known as Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA).  In 2016, this Court af-
firmed, by an equally divided Court, a decision of the 
Fifth Circuit holding that two related U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) discretionary enforcement 
policies, including an expansion of the DACA policy, were 
likely unlawful and should be enjoined.  See United 
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (per curiam).  In Sep-
tember 2017, DHS determined that the original DACA 
policy was unlawful and would likely be struck down by 
the courts on the same grounds as the related policies.  
DHS thus instituted an orderly wind-down of the DACA 
policy.  The questions presented are as follows: 
1. Whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA 
policy is judicially reviewable. 
2. Whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA 
policy is lawful. 
 
(II) 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Petitioners are Donald J. Trump, President of the 
United States; William P. Barr, Attorney General of the 
United States; Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary 
of Homeland Security; U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity; L. Francis Cissna, Director of U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services; Matthew T. Albence, Acting Director of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement; John P. Sanders, Acting 
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and the United 
States.  
Respondents are Casa de Maryland; Coalition for Hu-
mane Immigrant Rights; Fair Immigration Movement; 
One America; Promise Arizona; Make the Road Pennsyl-
vania; Michigan United; Arkansas United Community 
Coalition; Junta for Progressive Action, Inc.; Angel Agui-
luz; Estefany Rodriguez; Heymi Elvir Maldonado; Nath-
aly Uribe Robledo; Eliseo Mages; Jesus Eusebio Perez; 
Josue Aguiluz; Missael Garcia; Jose Aguiluz; Maricruz 
Abarca; Annabelle Martines Herra; Maria Joseline Cuel-
lar Baldelomar; Brenda Moreno Martinez; Luis Aguilar; 
J.M.O., a minor child; Adriana Gonzales Magos, next of 
friend to J.M.O.; A.M., a minor child; Isabel Cristina Agui-
lar Arce, next of friend to A.M.
(III) 
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In the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
No. 18-1469 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. 
CASA DE MARYLAND, ET AL. 
 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and other federal parties, 
respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.   
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,  
1a-61a) is not yet reported but is available at 2019 WL 
2147204.  The memorandum opinion of the district court 
(App., infra, 62a-98a) is reported at 284 F. Supp. 3d 758.   
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on 
May 17, 2019.  The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked 
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Pertinent statutory provisions are set forth in the 
appendix to the petition for a writ of certiorari in DHS 
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v. Regents of the University of California, No. 18-587, 
at 127a-143a (filed Nov. 5, 2018) (Regents App.).   
STATEMENT 
1. a. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),  
8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., charges the Secretary of Home-
land Security “with the administration and enforce-
ment” of the immigration laws.  8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1).  In-
dividual aliens are subject to removal if, inter alia, 
“they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been 
convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set 
by federal law.”  Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 
396 (2012); see 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017); 
see also 8 U.S.C. 1227(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017).  As a 
practical matter, however, the federal government can-
not remove every removable alien, and a “principal fea-
ture of the removal system is the broad discretion exer-
cised by immigration officials.”  Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396.   
For any alien subject to removal, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) officials must first “decide 
whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.”  Ari-
zona, 567 U.S. at 396.  After removal proceedings begin, 
government officials may decide to grant discretionary 
protection or relief from removal, such as asylum or can-
cellation of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1229b.  
And, “[a]t each stage” of the process, “the Executive has 
discretion to abandon the endeavor.”  Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483 
(1999) (AADC).  In making these decisions, like other 
agencies exercising enforcement discretion, DHS must 
engage in “a complicated balancing of a number of fac-
tors which are peculiarly within its expertise.”  Heckler 
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).  Recognizing the 
need for such balancing, Congress has provided that the 
“Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall be responsible 
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for  * * *  [e]stablishing national immigration enforce-
ment policies and priorities.”  6 U.S.C. 202(5) (2012 & 
Supp. V 2017). 
b. In 2012, DHS announced the policy known as  
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).  See 
Regents App. 97a-101a.  Deferred action is a practice in 
which the Secretary exercises discretion to notify an al-
ien of a decision to forbear from seeking the alien’s re-
moval for a designated period.  AADC, 525 U.S. at 484.  
Under DHS regulations, aliens granted deferred action 
may apply for and receive work authorization for the 
duration of the deferred-action grant if they establish 
economic necessity.  8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14).  A grant of 
deferred action does not confer lawful immigration sta-
tus or provide any defense to removal.  DHS retains dis-
cretion to revoke deferred action unilaterally, and the 
alien remains removable at any time. 
DACA made deferred action available to “certain 
young people who were brought to this country as chil-
dren.”  Regents App. 97a.  The INA does not provide 
any exemptions or special relief from removal for such 
individuals.  And dating back to at least 2001, bipartisan 
efforts to provide such relief legislatively had failed.1  
Under the DACA policy, following successful comple-
tion of a background check and other review, an alien 
would receive deferred action for a period of two years, 
subject to renewal.  Id. at 99a-100a.  The policy made 
clear that it “confer[red] no substantive right, immigra-
tion status or pathway to citizenship,” because  “[o]nly 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., S. 1291, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); S. 1545,  
108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); S. 2075, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005);  




the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, 
can confer these rights.”  Id. at 101a. 
DHS explained that information provided in the 
DACA request process would be protected from disclo-
sure for the purpose of immigration enforcement pro-
ceedings unless certain criteria related to national secu-
rity or public safety were satisfied, or the individual met 
the requirements for a Notice to Appear.  U.S. Citizen-
ship & Immigration Servs., DHS, Deferred Action  
for Childhood Arrivals:  Frequently Asked Questions, 
https://go.usa.gov/xngCd.  DHS also stated, however, 
that this information-sharing policy “may be modified, 
superseded, or rescinded at any time without notice,” 
and that it “may not be relied upon to create any right 
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law 
by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal 
matter.”  Ibid.   
Later, in 2014, DHS created a new policy of enforce-
ment discretion referred to as Deferred Action for Par-
ents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA).  See Regents App. 102a-110a.  Through a pro-
cess expressly designed to be “similar to DACA,” 
DAPA made deferred action available for certain indi-
viduals who had a child who was a U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident.  Id. at 107a; see id. at 107a-108a.  
At the same time, DHS also expanded DACA by extend-
ing the deferred-action period from two to three years 
and by loosening the age and residency criteria.  Id. at 
106a-107a.  
c. Soon thereafter, Texas and 25 other States brought 
suit in the Southern District of Texas to enjoin DAPA 
and the expansion of DACA.  The district court issued a 
nationwide preliminary injunction, finding a likelihood 
of success on the claim that the DAPA and expanded 
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DACA memorandum was a “ ‘substantive’ rule that should 
have undergone the notice-and-comment rule making 
procedure” required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.  Texas v. United States, 
86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 671 (S.D. Tex. 2015); see id. at 607, 
647, 664-678.   
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction, holding 
that the DAPA and expanded DACA policies likely vio-
lated both the APA and the INA.  Texas v. United 
States, 809 F.3d 134, 146, 170-186 (2015).  The court of 
appeals concluded that plaintiffs had “established a sub-
stantial likelihood of success on the merits of their pro-
cedural claim” that DAPA and expanded DACA were 
invalidly instituted without notice and comment.  Id. at 
178.  The court also concluded, “as an alternate and ad-
ditional ground,” that the policies were substantively 
contrary to law.  Ibid.  The court observed that the INA 
contains an “intricate system of immigration classifica-
tions and employment eligibility,” and “does not grant 
the Secretary discretion to grant deferred action and 
lawful presence on a class-wide basis to 4.3 million oth-
erwise removable aliens.”  Id. at 184, 186 n.202.  It also 
noted that Congress had repeatedly declined to enact 
legislation “closely resembl[ing] DACA and DAPA.”  
Id. at 185.   
After briefing and argument, this Court affirmed the 
Fifth Circuit’s judgment by an equally divided Court, 
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per 
curiam), leaving the nationwide injunction in place.    
d. In June 2017, Texas and other plaintiff States in 
the Texas case announced their intention to amend their 
complaint to challenge the original DACA policy.  D. Ct. 
Doc. 26-1, at 238-240 (Nov. 15, 2017).  They asserted that 
“[f ]or the[] same reasons that DAPA and Expanded 
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DACA’s unilateral Executive Branch conferral of eligi-
bility for lawful presence and work authorization was 
unlawful, the original June 15, 2012 DACA memoran-
dum is also unlawful.”  Id. at 239.    
On September 5, 2017, rather than confront litiga-
tion challenging DACA on essentially the same grounds 
that had succeeded in Texas before the same court for 
the DAPA and expanded DACA policies, DHS decided 
to wind down DACA in an orderly fashion.  Regents 
App. 111a-119a.  In the rescission memorandum, then-
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine C. Duke 
explained that, “[t]aking into consideration the Supreme 
Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in the ongoing 
litigation,” as well as the Attorney General’s view that 
the DACA policy was unlawful and that the “potentially 
imminent” challenge to DACA would “likely  * * *  yield 
similar results” as the Texas litigation, “it is clear that 
the June 15, 2012 DACA program should be termi-
nated.”  Id. at 116a-117a.  The Acting Secretary accord-
ingly announced that, “[i]n the exercise of [her] author-
ity in establishing national immigration policies and pri-
orities,” the original DACA memorandum was “re-
scind[ed].”  Id. at 117a.  
The rescission memorandum stated, however, that 
the government “[w]ill not terminate the grants of pre-
viously issued deferred action  * * *  solely based on the 
directives in this memorandum” for the remaining two-
year periods.  Regents App. 118a.  The memorandum also 
explained that DHS would “provide a limited window in 
which it w[ould] adjudicate certain requests for DACA.”  
Id. at 117a.  Specifically, DHS would “adjudicate—on an 
individual, case by case basis—properly filed pending 
DACA renewal requests  * * *  from current beneficiar-
ies that have been accepted by the Department as of the 
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date of this memorandum, and from current beneficiar-
ies whose benefits will expire between the date of this 
memorandum and March 5, 2018 that have been ac-
cepted by the Department as of October 5, 2017.”  Id. at 
117a-118a. 
DHS has also made clear that the “information- 
sharing policy has not changed in any way since it was 
first announced, including as a result of the Sept. 5, 
2017” DACA rescission.  U.S. Citizenship & Immigra-
tion Servs., DHS, Guidance on Rejected DACA Requests, 
https://go.usa.gov/xPVmG; see DHS, Frequently Asked 
Questions:  Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA), https://go.usa.gov/xPVmE.   
e. Shortly after DHS’s decision to rescind DACA, 
challenges to the rescission were filed across the coun-
try, including in the Northern District of California, the 
Eastern District of New York, the District of Columbia, 
and, in this case, the District of Maryland.  See, e.g.,  
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, No. 17-cv-5211 
(N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 8, 2017); NAACP v. Trump, No. 
17-cv-1907 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 18, 2017); Batalla Vidal 
v. Nielsen, No. 16-cv-4756 (E.D.N.Y. second amended 
complaint filed Sept. 19, 2017). The plaintiffs alleged 
that the termination of DACA is unlawful because it is 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA; violates the 
APA’s requirement for notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing; and denies respondents equal protection and due 
process.  See, e.g., App., infra, 12a.  The government 
defended, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims are not re-
viewable under the APA and that, in any event, DHS 
rationally explained the decision to wind down the dis-
cretionary DACA policy, given the agency’s conclusion 
that the policy is unlawful and the imminent risk of its 
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being invalidated in the Texas case, and that the plain-
tiffs’ claims are otherwise without merit.  
The first nationwide injunction soon followed.  On 
January 9, 2018, in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 
supra, the district court entered a preliminary injunc-
tion requiring the government to “maintain the DACA 
program on a nationwide basis on the same terms and 
conditions as were in effect before the rescission on 
September 5, 2017,” with certain exceptions.  Regents 
App. 66a; see id. at 1a-70a.  The court determined that, 
although agency decisions “not to prosecute or initiate 
enforcement actions are generally not reviewable,” the 
rescission of DACA was different because it concerned 
a “broad enforcement polic[y],” rather than an “  ‘indi-
vidual enforcement decision,’ ” and the “main” rationale 
for rescinding the prior policy was its “supposed illegal-
ity,” which the court reasoned it could assess.  Id. at 
27a-28a, 30a (citation omitted).  The court concluded 
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that 
the rescission was arbitrary and capricious because, in 
the court’s view, it was “based on a flawed legal prem-
ise.”  Id. at 42a.   
The same court largely denied the government’s  
motion to dismiss three days later.  Regents App. 71a-
90a.  It declined to dismiss respondents’ arbitrary-and-
capricious claim for the same reasons it granted the na-
tionwide preliminary injunction.  Id. at 72a.  And the 
court declined to dismiss the equal-protection claim, 
concluding that respondents’ allegations “raise a plau-
sible inference that racial animus towards Mexicans and 
Latinos was a motivating factor in the decision to end 
DACA.”  Id. at 87a; see id. at 83a-87a.  The court sua 
sponte certified that order for interlocutory appeal pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b).  Regents App. 89a. 
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f. Less than a week later, the merits of the dispute 
reached this Court for the first time.  On January 18, 
2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certi-
orari before judgment seeking review the Regents 
court’s orders.  DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 
17-1003.  The government contended that the district 
court’s unprecedented order requiring DHS to maintain 
a discretionary policy of non-enforcement on a nation-
wide basis warranted this Court’s immediate review.  In 
February 2018, the Court denied the government’s pe-
tition.  DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 138 S. Ct. 
1182.  But the Court stated that its order was “without 
prejudice” and it “assumed that the Court of Appeals 
w[ould] proceed expeditiously to decide this case.”  Ibid.   
When the government’s Regents appeal remained 
pending before the Ninth Circuit eight months later, 
the government filed a second petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari before judgment in Regents, along with similar 
petitions for writs of certiorari before judgment to the 
Second and D.C. Circuits, both of which were (and are) 
considering appeals of similar orders.  See DHS v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18-587 (filed Nov. 5, 2018); 
Trump v. NAACP, No. 18-588 (filed Nov. 5, 2018); 
McAleenan v. Batalla Vidal, No. 18-589 (filed Nov. 5, 
2018).  The government explained that the petitions were 
necessary for the Court to consider and resolve this im-
portant dispute during the current Term.  While brief-
ing proceeded on those petitions, the Ninth Circuit re-
solved the appeal in Regents, affirming the district 
court’s orders.  Regents Gov’t Supp. Br. App. 1a-78a.  
The government filed a supplemental brief, alerting this 
Court to the Ninth Circuit’s decision and suggesting 
that the government’s petition in that case should be 
10 
 
considered a petition for a writ of certiorari after judg-
ment, in keeping with the Court’s practice in similar 
cases.  Regents Gov’t Supp. Br. 1.  No other party ob-
jected to the government’s suggestion.   
The government’s petitions in Regents, Batalla Vi-
dal, and NAACP were distributed to the Court for con-
sideration at its January 11, 2019 Conference.  They 
were redistributed for consideration at the Court’s Jan-
uary 18, 2019 Conference.  No further activity has been 
recorded on the dockets.        
2. Meanwhile, this case proceeded in parallel in the 
District of Maryland.  In March 2018, the district court 
granted the government’s motion for summary judg-
ment in relevant part.  App., infra, 62a-98a.  Although 
the court concluded that respondents’ claims were jus-
ticiable, id. at 75a-79a, it rejected on the merits each of 
respondents’ challenges to DACA’s rescission, id. at 
81a-97a.  The court reasoned that the rescission was ex-
empt from APA’s notice-and-comment requirements 
because the rescission memorandum provides guidance 
on the agency’s “exercise of discretion,” not “a rule with 
the force of law.”  Id. at 82a.  It rejected respondents’ 
arbitrary-and-capricious challenge, observing that “[r]e-
gardless of whether DACA is, in fact, lawful or unlaw-
ful,” the agency’s “belief that it was unlawful and sub-
ject to serious legal challenge is completely rational.”  
Id. at 83a.  And the court concluded that respondents’ 
allegation of discriminatory intent was “unsupported by 
the record,” and that they otherwise failed to establish 
a violation of equal-protection, due-process, or estoppel 
principles.  Id. at 93a; see id. at 84a-95a.  Respondents 
appealed.2          
                                                     
2 The district court also concluded that it was “theoretically pos-
sible” that the government might use information obtained from 
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3. In June 2018, while this case was pending before 
the Fourth Circuit, then-Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity Kirstjen M. Nielsen issued a memorandum in re-
sponse to the district court in NAACP v. Trump, supra, 
providing further explanation of DHS’s decision to re-
scind DACA.  Regents App. 120a-126a.  Secretary Niel-
sen concluded that “the DACA policy properly was—
and should be—rescinded, for several separate and in-
dependently sufficient reasons.”  Id. at 122a.  First, the 
Secretary agreed that “the DACA policy was contrary 
to law” and explained that “[a]ny arguable distinctions 
between the DAPA and DACA policies” were “not suf-
ficiently material” to convince her otherwise.  Ibid.; see 
id. at 122a-123a.  Second, the Secretary reasoned that, 
in any event, “[l]ike Acting Secretary Duke, [she] 
lack[s] sufficient confidence in the DACA policy’s legal-
ity to continue this non-enforcement policy, whether the 
courts would ultimately uphold it or not.” Id. at 123a.  
She noted that “[t]here are sound reasons for a law en-
forcement agency to avoid discretionary policies that 
are legally questionable.”  Ibid.  Third, the Secretary 
offered several “reasons of enforcement policy to re-
scind the DACA policy,” regardless of whether the pol-
icy is “illegal or legally questionable.”  Ibid.  The Secre-
tary also explained that, although she “do[es] not come 
to these conclusions lightly,” “neither any individual’s 
reliance on the expected continuation of the DACA pol-
                                                     
DACA requestors in a manner inconsistent with estoppel principles, 
and therefore enjoined DHS to comply with the information-sharing 
policy as “first announced in 2012” pending further order from the 
court.  App., infra, 95a; 3/15/18 Am. Order 1; see App., infra, 95a-
97a.  The court of appeals, however, vacated that injunction, and it 
is not at issue in this petition.  App., infra, 33a-35a. 
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icy nor the sympathetic circumstances of DACA recipi-
ents as a class” outweigh the reasons to end the policy.  
Id. at 125a.  The parties addressed the implications of 
Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum for this case in their 
briefs to the court of appeals.  See, e.g., Gov’t C.A. Br. 
38-39, 41-42; Resps. C.A. Resp. & Reply Br. 16. 
4. On May 17, 2019, a divided panel of the court of 
appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in 
part, dismissed in part, and remanded the case to the 
district court.  App., infra, 1a-37a.   
a. The panel majority first determined, like the dis-
trict court, that respondents’ claims were justiciable.  
App., infra, 14a-25a.  The majority acknowledged that, 
under Chaney, supra, an agency’s decision whether “to 
enforce the substantive law” was presumptively “com-
mitted to agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2).  
App., infra, 19a; see id. at 18a-19a.  But it concluded that 
the presumption was inapplicable here.  Id. at 19a-23a.  
Because DACA’s rescission was a “[m]ajor agency pol-
icy decision[],” rather than an exercise of enforcement 
discretion “in an individual case,” the court concluded 
that the rescission was “not a ‘Chaney-type enforcement 
action.’ ”  Id. at 19a-20a (brackets and citation omitted).   
The court of appeals further concluded that Section 
1252 of the INA did not require that challenges to 
DACA’s rescission be raised only at the behest of an in-
dividual alien after a final order of removal.  App., infra, 
14a-16a.  In the court’s view, the rescission of DACA 
was not a “  ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceed-
ings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders’ ” such 
that Section 1252(g) would preclude review prior to a 
final order of removal.  Id. at 14a (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
1252(g)).  And it reasoned that the “ ‘zipper’ clause” in 
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Section 1252(b)(9), AADC, 525 U.S. at 483—which pro-
vides that “[ j]udicial review of all questions of law and 
fact  * * *  arising from any action taken  * * *  to re-
move an alien  * * *  shall be available only in judicial 
review of a final order under [Section 1252],” 8 U.S.C. 
1252(b)(9)—“applies only with respect to review of an 
order of removal under [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)].”  App., 
infra, 16a (citation omitted; brackets in original). 
b. On the merits, the court of appeals agreed with 
every court to have considered the issue that DACA’s 
rescission did not violate the procedural requirements 
in the APA.  App., infra, 25a-28a.  The court observed 
that while the rescission removed a “mechanism under 
which individuals could receive deferred action,” it did 
not create any “ ‘new binding rule of substantive law’ ” 
or “curtail [DHS’s] discretion to make deferred action 
available on a case-by-case or ad hoc basis.”  Id. at 27a-
28a (citation omitted).  The court thus concluded that 
the rescission memorandum was a “general statement[] 
of policy” to which the APA’s notice-and-comment re-
quirements “do[] not apply.”  Id. at 26a (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
553(b)(A)). 
The court of appeals determined, however, that the 
rescission was substantively arbitrary and capricious, 
because DHS “failed to give a reasoned explanation for 
the change in policy, particularly given the significant 
reliance interests involved.”  App., infra, 31a.  The court 
rejected DHS’s reliance on the Texas litigation as justi-
fying the change, observing that “DACA and DAPA are 
not identical.”  Id. at 32a (quoting Texas, 809 F.3d at 
174).  It faulted DHS for not explaining “why it was 
likely that the district court in the Texas litigation 
would have enjoined DACA.”  Ibid.  And the court of 
appeals criticized DHS for not “adequately account[ing] 
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for the reliance interests” of individuals who would be 
affected by the rescission of the policy.  Id. at 33a.  In a 
footnote, the court refused to consider the explanation 
in Secretary Nielsen’s June 22 memorandum on the 
ground that the memorandum “was not part of the ad-
ministrative record in this appeal.”  Id. at 33a n.18.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court’s arbitrary-and-capricious ruling, vacated 
DACA’s rescission in its entirety, and remanded the 
matter for “further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.”  App., infra, 36a.3  In light of that disposition, 
the court of appeals declined to consider whether DHS’s 
“conclusions about DACA’s legality [we]re substan-
tively incorrect.”  Id. at 31a n.17.  It also “decline[d] to 
decide whether DACA’s rescission violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process and equal protection guaran-
tees.”  Id. at 35a.  As to the constitutional claims, the 
court “vacate[d] the district court’s judgment on th[o]se 
issues and dismiss[ed] those claims.”  Id. at 37a.   
c. Judge Richardson concurred in part and dissented 
in part.  App., infra, 38a-61a.  In his view, “the rescission 
of DACA is judicially unreviewable under the APA.”  Id. 
at 42a.  Judge Richardson explained that “[d]iscretion 
in prosecutorial enforcement is deeply rooted in the 
Constitution’s separation of powers.”  Id. at 43a.  He ob-
served that “[i]t is normally neither appropriate nor 
                                                     
3 Because the court of appeals vacated the rescission in its en-
tirety, should the decision take effect, it would alter the status quo 
and require DHS to, among other things, accept new DACA re-
quests in addition to renewal requests (as required by the Regents 
and Batalla Vidal injunctions).  Accordingly, the government in-
tends to file a motion in the court of appeals shortly, asking the court 
to stay its mandate. 
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necessary for judges to involve themselves in the deci-
sion to bring, or not to bring, enforcement actions.”  Id. 
at 44a.  And he concluded that DHS’s decision to rescind 
the policy of enforcement discretion at issue here should 
be treated no differently.  See id. at 46a-49a.   
Judge Richardson rejected the majority’s new “gen-
eral enforcement policies” exception to these justiciabil-
ity principles.  App., infra, 49a.  He noted that such an 
exception was irreconcilable with Chaney, which itself 
concerned “the FDA’s categorical decision not to take 
enforcement action against a class of actors (drug man-
ufacturers, prison administrators, and others in the 
drug distribution chain)” for the use of certain lethal-
injection drugs.  Id. at 50a.  He also reasoned that such 
an exception was “untenable” as a logical matter.  Id. at 
51a.  “Standardizing (i.e., generalizing) how agents use 
their prosecutorial discretion does not alter its charac-
ter.”  Ibid.  In fact, he reasoned, “[t]o find that discre-
tionary enforcement decisions are unreviewable only 
when inferior officers exercise single-shot” discretion 
would “brush[] aside” the constitutional separation of 
powers in which the responsibility for such decisions 
“remains firmly at the President’s feet.”  Id. at 51a-52a.   
Judge Richardson determined that respondents’ 
constitutional claims were reviewable, App., infra, 56a 
n.6, but he had “little trouble” agreeing with the district 
court that they failed on the merits, id. at 56a.  With 
respect to due process, he reasoned that respondents 
“fail[ed] to articulate a constitutionally protected life, 
liberty, or property interest impacted by the rescis-
sion.”  Ibid.  Indeed, he noted that the DACA memoran-
dum itself disavowed creating any rights or entitlements, 
“acknowledg[ing] that such rights could be conferred 
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only by ‘Congress, acting through its legislative author-
ity.’  ”  Id. at 57a (quoting Regents App. 101a).  With re-
spect to equal protection, Judge Richardson concluded 
that respondents had failed to create a “plausible infer-
ence” of invidious animus on the part of the Attorney 
General or Acting Secretary in “tak[ing] the official 
government actions at issue,” much less the showing of 
“outrageous discrimination” that would be required to 
establish what in essence is a selective-prosecution 
claim.  Id. at 58a-59a. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
In November 2018, the government filed petitions 
for writs of certiorari before judgment to the Second, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits to review decisions concluding 
that the rescission of DACA either is or likely is unlaw-
ful.  Six months later, those petitions remain pending 
before this Court.  In the meantime, by virtue of two 
nationwide injunctions, the government remains obli-
gated to keep in place a discretionary policy of non- 
enforcement that the Attorney General and DHS have 
reasonably concluded is unlawful and that is sanctioning 
an ongoing violation of federal immigration law by 
nearly 700,000 aliens.  That state of affairs calls for this 
Court’s immediate action.  
As the government has explained in its previous fil-
ings, the DACA policy is materially indistinguishable 
from the related policies that the Fifth Circuit held 
were contrary to federal immigration law in a decision 
that four Justices of this Court voted to affirm.  Con-
sistent with that decision, DHS has decided that such a 
policy should be adopted only by legislative action, not 
unilateral executive action.  Yet a divided panel of the 
court of appeals in this case, like those earlier courts, 
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concluded that DHS somehow acted arbitrarily and ca-
priciously by relying in part on the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion to reach that conclusion.  The court of appeals’ de-
cision is of a piece with the related decisions pending 
before this Court, and it is wrong for the reasons ex-
plained in the petition for a writ of certiorari in DHS v. 
Regents of the University of California, No. 18-587 
(filed Nov. 5, 2018).  At a minimum, these decisions 
presently warrant this Court’s plenary review.  Accord-
ingly, to facilitate the Court’s orderly consideration of 
this important dispute, the government respectfully 
submits that the Court should expedite consideration of 
this petition, grant the government’s petition in this 
case and the other pending cases before the Court’s 
summer recess, and consolidate the cases for review 
next Term. 
A. The Questions Presented Warrant The Court’s Immediate 
Review 
The government’s petition in Regents explains in de-
tail why a grant of certiorari is necessary in order to 
obtain an appropriately prompt resolution of this im-
portant dispute.  Regents Pet. 15-17.  In February 2018, 
this Court recognized the need for an “expeditious[]” 
resolution of this dispute in its order denying without 
prejudice the government’s petition for a writ of certio-
rari before judgment in DHS v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California, 138 S. Ct. 1182.  Now 15 months later, 
the government is still being required to retain a discre-
tionary non-enforcement policy that DHS and the At-
torney General have correctly concluded is unlawful 
and that sanctions the ongoing violation of federal law 
by more than half a million people. 
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In the meantime, the very existence of this pending 
litigation (and lingering uncertainty) continues to im-
pede efforts to enact legislation addressing the legiti-
mate policy concerns underlying the DACA policy.  See, 
e.g., S.M., What the Supreme Court’s Silence on DACA 
Means, The Economist, Jan. 23, 2019, https://www. 
economist.com/democracy-in-america/2019/01/23/what-
the-supreme-courts-silence-on-daca-means (explaining 
that the existing injunctions are frustrating legislative 
negotiations); Ted Mitchell, Congress Must Act to Pro-
tect Dreamers Still Living in Legal Limbo, Fox News, 
May 21, 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/ted-
mitchell-congress-must-act-to-protect-dreamers-still-
living-in-legal-limbo) (describing the current inability to 
bring any legislation concerning DACA recipients to a 
vote); Jordan Fabian, Trump Rolls Out “Pro-American” 
Immigration Plan, The Hill, May 16, 2019, https:// 
thehill.com/homenews/administration/444092-trump-
rolls-out-pro-american-immigration-plan (noting that 
DACA was left out of the Administration’s most recent 
immigration proposal).  As a result, “the political pro-
cess has been pre-empted, and we have had over a year 
of bitter political division that included a government 
shutdown of unprecedented length.”  William P. Barr, 
Att’y Gen., Remarks to the American Law Institute on 
Nationwide Injunctions (May 21, 2019), https://go.usa. 
gov/xmGBx.  
B. This Case Squarely Presents The Reviewability And The 
Lawfulness Of DACA’s Rescission 
Like the others pending before the Court, this case 
squarely presents both of the questions presented.  Re-
spondents raise all of the principal challenges to the 
lawfulness of the rescission of DACA, including that it 
is arbitrary and capricious, that it should have gone 
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through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and that it vi-
olates equal-protection and due-process principles.  The 
government moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 
summary judgment on all of respondents’ claims on jus-
ticiability and merits grounds.  The district court re-
jected each of respondents’ claims on the merits.  The 
court of appeals passed on the justiciability issues and 
rested its merits determination on essentially the same 
arbitrary-and-capricious grounds on which the district 
courts in Regents and in McAleenan v. Batalla Vidal, 
No. 18-589 (filed Nov. 5, 2018), rested their nationwide 
preliminary injunctions and the district court in Trump 
v. NAACP, No. 18-588 (filed Nov. 5, 2018), based its fi-
nal order of vacatur.   
Moreover, although the court of appeals remanded 
the case to the district court, it did so only after finally 
resolving the arbitrary-and-capricious claim and “va-
cat[ing] as arbitrary and capricious” DACA’s rescission.  
App., infra, 36a.  And after declining to address the 
merits of respondents’ constitutional challenges, the 
court of appeals “vacate[d] the district court’s judgment 
on th[o]se issues and dismiss[ed] those claims.”  Id. at 
37a.  Because respondents pressed each of their consti-
tutional claims in the court of appeals, they remain  
free to reassert them in this Court as an alternative 
ground for affirmance.  See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312, 326 (1986).   A grant of certiorari to the Fourth Cir-
cuit would therefore bring before this Court the court 
of appeals’ final determination of all of the relevant is-




C. The Court Should Expedite Consideration Of This  
Petition, Grant The Government’s Petitions Before The 
Summer Recess, And Consolidate The Cases For  
Consideration Next Term   
To ensure an adequate vehicle for the timely and de-
finitive resolution of this dispute, the government re-
spectfully submits that the Court should expedite con-
sideration of this petition to permit consideration before 
the Court’s summer recess, alongside the pending peti-
tions in Regents, Batalla Vidal, and NAACP.  Those pe-
titions have now been pending before this Court for six 
months.  Briefing was completed on those petitions in 
early January 2019.  And although each of the petitions 
was filed as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judg-
ment, all parties appear to agree that given the Ninth 
Circuit’s intervening decision, the Regents petition is 
properly treated as an ordinary petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari after judgment.  Resolution of those petitions be-
fore the summer recess is critical, if the petitions are 
granted, to afford the government and the multiple pri-
vate and state parties involved sufficient time to coordi-
nate on a briefing schedule and to allow appropriate time 
for each side to address, and for the Court to consider 
and resolve, the many important issues presented by 
these cases.  And expedition of this petition would allow 
the Court to consider this petition at the same time. 
The Court should grant the petitions in this case, Re-
gents, and NAACP, and consolidate those cases for fur-
ther review.  Although respondents in this case present 
the principal challenges against the rescission of DACA 
and the court of appeals’ decision represents its final res-
olution of those issues, the court did not pass on the con-
stitutional claims and it refused to consider the implica-
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tions of Secretary Nielsen’s June 22 memorandum be-
fore vacating DACA’s rescission.  Granting the govern-
ment’s petitions in Regents and NAACP would bring be-
fore this Court the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of the 
equal-protection and due-process claims, and allow for 
consideration of the NAACP court’s analysis of the June 
22 memorandum.  See Regents Gov’t Supp. Br. 7-10.           
As for Batalla Vidal, as the government’s supple-
mental brief in Regents explained, the Court may still 
wish to grant the Batalla Vidal petition to permit the 
parties in those cases to participate in the Court’s con-
sideration of the overlapping issues.  See Regents Gov’t 
Supp. Br. 10-11.  The Court could, however, hold the 
Batalla Vidal petition pending resolution of the govern-
ment’s petitions in the other cases to ensure that an or-
der vacating the nationwide injunction in Regents would 
have immediate effect on the identical injunction issued 




The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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Before:  KING, DIAZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges. 
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:  
In 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security estab-
lished the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(“DACA”) policy.  Under this policy, certain nonciti-
zens who came to the United States as children could 
receive deferred action—a decision forbearing their re-
moval from the country.  Hundreds of thousands of in-
dividuals, including those who appear as Plaintiffs in 
these appeals, applied for and received grants of de-
ferred action under DACA.  
In 2017, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security 
rescinded DACA, which prompted a flurry of lawsuits 
across the country challenging the action.  Plaintiffs in 
these appeals (a group of individuals and organizations) 
allege that the government’s decision to rescind DACA 
(and its changes to policies governing the use of infor-
mation provided by DACA applicants) violates the Fifth 
4a 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq., 
and common law principles of estoppel.  
On the government’s motion for summary judgment, 
the district court determined that Plaintiffs’ challenges 
were subject to judicial review, that the rescission of 
DACA and changes to the government’s policies on use 
of DACA applicant information did not violate the APA, 
that the constitutional claims were without merit, and 
that DACA’s rescission did not violate principles of es-
toppel.  The court, however, ordered the government 
(on grounds of estoppel) to comply with the policies 
promulgated in 2012 on the use of information provided 
by DACA applicants and enjoined it from altering these 
policies.  
As we explain, we agree with the district court that 
Plaintiffs’ challenges are subject to judicial review.  
We also agree with the district court that the govern-
ment’s decision to rescind DACA did not require notice 
and comment under the APA.  But the decision none-
theless violated the APA because—on the administra-
tive record before us—it was not adequately explained 
and thus was arbitrary and capricious.  We also con-
clude that the district court erred in ordering the gov-
ernment to comply with its policies promulgated in 2012 
on the use of information provided by DACA applicants 
and enjoining it from altering those policies.  
Given our resolution, we decline, under the doctrine 
of constitutional avoidance, to decide whether Plaintiffs’ 
Fifth Amendment rights were violated.  Nor do we ad-
dress Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments challenging the 




Before turning to the record material, some context 
is in order.  The Secretary of Homeland Security is 
“charged with the administration and enforcement” of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a)(1).  One of the enforcement tools available 
under the INA is the removal of aliens from the United 
States.  “Aliens may be removed if they were inadmis-
sible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain 
crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law.”  Ar-
izona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012); see  
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a) (listing classes of deportable 
and inadmissible aliens).  
Because of the “practical fact,” however, that the 
government can’t possibly remove all such aliens, the 
Secretary has discretion to prioritize the removal of 
some and to deprioritize the removal of others.  Arpaio 
v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see 6 U.S.C. 
§ 202(5) (charging the Secretary of Homeland Security 
with “[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement 
policies and priorities”).  One form of discretion the 
government exercises is deferred action, which “is a de-
cision by Executive Branch officials not to pursue depor-
tation proceedings against an individual or class of indi-
viduals otherwise eligible for removal from this coun-
try.”  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 908 F.3d 476, 
487 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 
3201 (U.S. Nov. 5 & 19, 2018) (No. 18-587).  
Immigration authorities have granted deferred ac-
tion and related forms of relief from deportation or re-
moval since at least the early 1960s.  See id. at 487-89; 
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The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to 
Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Pre-
sent in the United States and to Defer Removal of Oth-
ers, 38 Op. O.L.C. ____, 2014 WL 10788677, at *10-13 
(Nov. 19, 2014) (“2014 OLC Opinion”)1 (addressing the 
Department’s practices of granting deferred action ad 
hoc and through broad policies making relief from re-
moval available to particular groups of aliens).  The Su-
preme Court also has recognized deferred action  
by name, describing it as the executive branch’s “regu-
lar practice  . . .  of exercising  . . .  discretion for  
humanitarian reasons or simply for its own conven-
ience.”  Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. 
(“AAADC”), 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999).  
B. 
Turning now to the record material, the essential  
undisputed facts are as follows.  To ensure government 
resources were not spent on the “low priority cases” of 
“certain young people who were brought to [the United 
                                                 
1  The Office of Legal Counsel, or OLC, is an office within the U.S. 
Department of Justice that drafts legal opinions of the Attorney 
General and provides its own written opinions and other advice in 
response to requests from various agencies within the executive 
branch.  See 28 U.S.C. § 512 (providing that agency heads may seek 
legal advice from the Attorney General); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (delegating 
Attorney General’s authority to render legal advice to OLC); “Office 
of Legal Counsel,” The United States Department of Justice, https:// 
www.justice.gov/olc (saved as ECF opinion attachment).  Although 
not binding on courts, OLC opinions “reflect[] the legal position of 
the executive branch” and “are generally viewed as providing bind-
ing interpretive guidance for executive agencies.”  United States v. 
Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 385 n.16 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).  
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States] as children and know only this country as home,” 
J.A. 129, then Secretary of Homeland Security Janet 
Napolitano announced in a June 15, 2012, memorandum 
the policy that has become known as DACA.  The DACA 
Memo made renewable two-year terms of deferred ac-
tion from removal and authorization for employment 
available to individuals who came to the United States 
as children, satisfied certain other eligibility criteria, 2 
and passed background checks.  
To be considered for deferred action under DACA, 
applicants had to submit to biometric screening and pro-
vide extensive personal information to the Department 
of Homeland Security.  The Department informed ap-
plicants that the information provided was “protected 
from disclosure  . . .  for the purpose of immigration 
enforcement proceedings” unless the requestor met cri-
teria for commencement of removal proceedings or re-
ferral to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
for a determination whether to commence removal pro-
ceedings.3  J.A. 1004.  The Department warned, how-
ever, that these policies could be “modified, superseded, 
or rescinded at any time without notice” and were “not 
intended to” and did not “create any right or benefit, 
                                                 
2  In its original form, deferred action was available to individuals 
who were under age 16 when they came to the United States, were 
not above age 30, had continuously resided in the United States for 
at least five years preceding June 15, 2012, and were present in the 
country on June 15, 2012, and satisfied certain other requirements 
relative to public safety and education or military service. 
3  Separately, the Department noted that the information provided 
could be shared with national security and law enforcement agencies 
“for purposes other than removal.”  J.A. 1004. 
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substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any 
party.”  Id.  
The DACA Memo made clear that it “confer[red] no 
substantive right, immigration status[,] or pathway to 
citizenship.”  J.A. 131.  DACA recipients, however, 
were eligible to receive a host of other benefits under 
preexisting statutes and regulations, including advance 
parole allowing reentry into the United States after 
travel abroad, social security benefits, and certain forms 
of public assistance.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A), 
1611(b)(1), 1621(b)(1), (d); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.3(a)(4)(vi), 212.5.  
DACA recipients also were eligible to receive employ-
ment authorization on a showing of economic necessity.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).  
In November 2014, then Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity Jeh Johnson announced a separate deferred ac-
tion policy for certain parents of United States citizens 
and lawful permanent residents that became known as 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”).4 
The DAPA memorandum also expanded DACA by  
(1) extending the deferred action and employment au-
thorization terms from two to three years; (2) removing 
the “age cap” that previously excluded certain individuals 
from DACA eligibility; and (3) reducing the period of time 
                                                 
4  The 2014 OLC Opinion concluded that DAPA “would constitute a 
permissible exercise of [the Department of Homeland Security]’s en-
forcement discretion under the INA.”  J.A. 162; 2014 WL 10788677, 
at *23.  While the opinion doesn’t directly address the Department’s 
authority to implement DACA, it does recount that, before DACA 
was announced, the OLC had “orally advised” the Department that 
the policy would be permissible “provided that immigration officials 
retained discretion to evaluate each application on an individualized 
basis.”  J.A. 149 n.8; 2014 WL 10788677, at *13 n.8.  
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that someone needed to be physically present in the 
United States to be eligible for DACA.  See J.A. 167-68.  
A coalition of states led by Texas sued to block imple-
mentation of the DAPA policy (and its proposed expan-
sions to DACA) on the grounds that it violated the APA 
and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 3 (the “Texas litigation”).  See Texas v. United 
States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 & n.1, 607 (S.D. Tex. 
2015).  The district court in that case granted injunc-
tive relief, id. at 671-72, 677-78 & n.111, and the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 
178-79, 186, 188 (5th Cir. 2015).  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment by an equally di-
vided vote.  United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 
(2016) (per curiam).  
In June 2017 (approximately five months after the 
Trump administration took office), then Secretary of 
Homeland Security John Kelly rescinded DAPA but left 
in place DACA and the deferred action relief and em-
ployment authorizations granted between the issuance 
of the DAPA Memo and the district court’s decision in 
the Texas litigation.  
On September 4, 2017, Attorney General Jefferson 
Sessions wrote to then Acting Secretary Elaine Duke, 
advising her to rescind DACA.  According to the Attor-
ney General:  
DACA was effectuated by the previous administra-
tion through executive action, without proper statu-
tory authority and with no established end-date, af-
ter Congress’ repeated rejection of proposed legisla-
tion that would have accomplished a similar result.  
Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration 
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laws was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by 
the Executive Branch.  The related  . . .  DAPA  
. . .  policy was enjoined on a nationwide basis in a 
decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit on the basis of 
multiple legal grounds and then by the Supreme 
Court by an equally divided vote.  . . .  Because 
the DACA policy has the same legal and constitu-
tional defects that the courts recognized as to DAPA, 
it is likely that potentially imminent litigation would 
yield similar results with respect to DACA.[5]  
In light of the costs and burdens that will be imposed 
on DHS associated with rescinding this policy, DHS 
should consider an orderly and efficient wind-down 
process.  
J.A. 379 (internal citations omitted).  
The next day, Acting Secretary Duke rescinded 
DACA and instructed Department personnel to “wind-
down” the policy.  J.A. 380, 383.  The Secretary’s Re-
scission Memo recounts in a “Background” section the 
DACA and DAPA policies, the Texas litigation, Secre-
tary Kelly’s rescission of DAPA, the letter to Attorney 
General Sessions from the plaintiffs in the Texas litiga-
tion, and General Sessions’s September 4 letter.  The 
Rescission Memo then states:  
Taking into consideration the Supreme Court’s and 
the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in the ongoing litigation, 
and the September 4, 2017[,] letter from the Attorney 
                                                 
5  Plaintiffs in the Texas litigation had written to General Sessions 
in June 2017, requesting that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
rescind DACA and prohibit new grants and renewals of deferred ac-
tion.  The letter warned that, if the Executive Branch failed to so act, 
plaintiffs there would amend their complaint to challenge DACA.  
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General, it is clear that the June 15, 2012[,] DACA 
program should be terminated.  
J.A. 383.  
The Rescission Memo—which issued without notice 
or an opportunity for public comment—did not end 
DACA outright.  Rather, it allowed for a case-by-case 
basis adjudication of initial applications for deferred ac-
tion and employment authorization accepted by Septem-
ber 5, 2017, and renewal requests accepted by October 
5, 2017, from current DACA beneficiaries whose bene-
fits would expire between September 5, 2017, and March 
5, 2018.  
The Memo stated that the Department would not ter-
minate existing grants of deferred action and employ-
ment authorization under DACA “solely based on the di-
rectives” in the Memo and would “generally honor” ap-
proved applications for advanced parole.  Id.  But it 
made clear that the Department would reject all other 
DACA applications, including initial applications filed 
after September 5, 2017, and all pending and future ap-
plications for advance parole under DACA.  Id.  The 
Memo, however, explicitly placed “no limitations” on the 
Department’s “otherwise lawful enforcement  . . .  
prerogatives.”  J.A. 384.  
The Department also announced that once an individ-
ual’s deferred action under DACA expired, information 
provided by applicants would not be “proactively pro-
vided to [law enforcement agencies] for the purpose of 
immigration enforcement proceedings” unless the re-
questor met criteria for commencement of removal pro-
ceedings or referral to U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement for a determination whether to commence 
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removal proceedings.  J.A. 1142.  For individuals whose 
pending DACA requests were denied, the announce-
ment stated that “[g]enerally, information provided in 
DACA requests will not be proactively provided to other 
law enforcement entities  . . .  for the purpose of im-
migration enforcement proceedings” unless the reques-
tor posed “a risk to national security or public safety” or 
met criteria for commencement of removal proceedings 
or referral to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment for a determination whether to commence removal 
proceedings.  J.A. 1143.  
Nearly 800,000 individuals have received deferred ac-
tion under DACA since its inception.  
C. 
Plaintiffs’ complaint raises a host of challenges to the 
government’s decision to rescind DACA.  First, the com-
plaint alleges that the rescission is a substantive rule 
and thus requires notice-and-comment rulemaking un-
der the APA.  Next, it asserts that the government’s 
decisions to rescind DACA and change the way the gov-
ernment proposed to share personal information collec-
ted from DACA applicants were arbitrary, capricious, 
and contrary to law, in violation of the APA, and violated 
the substantive and procedural due process protections 
of the Fifth Amendment.  Plaintiffs also allege that the 
decision to rescind DACA violates the equal protection 
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.  Finally, Plaintiffs 
say that the government should be equitably estopped 
from rescinding DACA or using information provided by 
DACA applicants for immigration enforcement pur-
poses beyond those first announced in 2012, when the 
government’s information-sharing policies were first 
implemented.  
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The district court granted partial summary judgment 
to the government.  The court found (contrary to the 
government’s contention) that Plaintiffs’ claims were 
justiciable.  Casa De Maryland v. DHS, 284 F. Supp. 
3d 758, 768-71 (D. Md. 2018).  But on the merits, the 
court determined that DACA’s rescission and the gov-
ernment’s changes to its policies on information-sharing 
did not violate the APA and that Plaintiffs’ constitu-
tional claims lacked merit.  Id. at 771-77.  The court 
also determined that DACA’s rescission did not violate 
the doctrine of estoppel.  Id. at 777-78.  
The court, however, granted summary judgment to 
Plaintiffs on the portion of their estoppel claim pertain-
ing to the sharing of DACA applicant information.  The 
court ordered the government to comply with the poli-
cies as originally announced in 2012 and enjoined it from 
altering these policies.  Id. at 778-79; J.A. 1531-33.  
These appeals followed.  We review a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment de novo.  Roland v. USCIS, 
850 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 2017).  “We can affirm a grant 
of summary judgment only where there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Certain Underwrit-
ers at Lloyd’s, London v. Cohen, 785 F.3d 886, 889-90 
(4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
review a district court’s grant of an injunction for abuse 
of discretion.  South Carolina v. United States, 907 F.3d 
742, 753 (4th Cir. 2018).  
II. 
We begin with the government’s argument that 
Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable, an issue we con-
sider de novo.  See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370 
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(4th Cir. 2014); Angelex Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 
500, 505 (4th Cir. 2013).  
A. 
The government contends that Plaintiffs’ claims are 
immune from judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), a 
provision of the INA stating, “no court shall have juris-
diction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any 
alien arising from the decision or action by the [Secre-
tary of Homeland Security] to commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any 
alien under this chapter.”  
According to the government, § 1252(g) bars review 
here in two ways.  First, noting that the Supreme Court 
in AAADC observed that § 1252(g) “seems clearly de-
signed to give some measure of protection to ‘no de-
ferred action’ decisions and similar discretionary deter-
minations,” 525 U.S. at 485,6 the government contends 
that this section bars review because DACA’s rescission 
is a “no deferred action” decision.  But this contention 
ignores both the plain language of § 1252(g) and the Su-
preme Court’s determination in AAADC that this sec-
tion “applies only to three discrete actions that the [Sec-
retary of Homeland Security] may take:  her ‘decision 
or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, 
or execute removal orders.’  ”  Id. at 482 (first emphasis 
                                                 
6  The Supreme Court said as much after reviewing a treatise de-
scribing the practice of deferred action and litigation that would re-
sult when it was not granted.  AAADC, 525 U.S. at 484-85.  That 
treatise, however, referred explicitly to “[e]fforts to challenge the 
refusal to exercise [deferred action] on behalf of specific aliens.”  
Id. at 485 (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs don’t challenge the refusal 
to grant deferred action to a particular individual. 
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added).  In rescinding DACA, the Acting Secretary did 
none of these things.  
Second, the government says that § 1252(g) pre-
cludes review because DACA’s rescission is an initial 
“action” in the commencement of removal proceedings.  
As the government would have it, review of its decision 
to rescind DACA must await a final order of removal.  
The Supreme Court in AAADC though “specifically re-
jected a broad reading of the three discrete actions 
listed in [§] 1252(g).”  Regents, 908 F.3d at 504.  Specifi-
cally, “decisions to open an investigation, [or] to surveil 
the suspected violator” are not encompassed by § 1252(g)’s 
jurisdictional bar, even though these decisions “may be 
part of the deportation process.”  AAADC, 525 U.S. at 
482; see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 
(2018) (Alito, J., plurality) (“[In AAADC, w]e did not in-
terpret [§ 1252(g)] to sweep in any claim that can tech-
nically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions.  
. . .  Instead, we read the language to refer to just 
those three specific actions themselves.”  (emphasis 
added)).  
And while we accept that § 1252(g) “is specifically di-
rected at the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence 
prolongation of removal proceedings,” AAADC, 525 U.S. 
at 487, the government hasn’t moved to remove any of 
the Plaintiffs.  The two Circuit decisions on which the 
government relies to support the proposition that judi-
cial review of DACA’s rescission is available only through 
review of a final order of removal—Vasquez v. Aviles, 
639 F. App’x 898 (3d Cir. 2016), and Botezatu v. INS,  
195 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1999)—are inapposite.  Those 
cases involved challenges to individual “no deferred  
action” decisions by aliens adjudicated removable.  
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Vasquez, 639 F. App’x at 901; Botezatu, 195 F.3d at 314.  
The government’s reliance on AAADC is therefore mis-
placed, and we reject its argument that § 1252(g) bars re-
view of Plaintiffs’ claims.7  
B. 
The government argues that another provision of the 
INA—8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)—bars review of Plaintiffs’ 
claims.  The government did not press this argument 
in the district court.  But because a party may chal-
lenge subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on  
appeal, Am. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 
326 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2003), we consider this issue.  
Section 1252(b)(9) provides that “[  j]udicial review of 
all questions of law and fact  . . .  arising from any ac-
tion taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien 
from the United States under this subchapter shall be 
available only in judicial review of a final order under 
this section.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).  But that provision 
doesn’t help the government here because it “applies 
only with respect to review of an order of removal under 
[8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)].”  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 
                                                 
7  Accord Regents, 908 F.3d at 504 (holding § 1252(g) doesn’t de-
prive courts of jurisdiction to review DACA’s rescission); NAACP v. 
Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 224 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting as “mis-
placed” government’s reliance on AAADC and finding § 1252(g) 
didn’t bar review of challenges to DACA’s rescission), appeals dock-
eted, Nos. 18-5243, 18-5245 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10 & 13, 2018), petition 
for cert. before judgment filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2018) 
(No. 18-588); Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 152-54 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (rejecting government’s § 1252(g) argument in chal-
lenge to DACA’s rescission), appeals docketed, Nos. 18-1985, 18-1986 
(2d Cir. July 5, 2018), petition for cert. before judgment filed,  
87 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2018) (No. 18-589). 
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313 (2001) (emphases added; internal quotation marks 
and alteration omitted); see Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 
232 F.3d 328, 340 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Congress enacted  
[§ 1252(b)(9)] for the important purpose of consolidating 
all claims that may be brought in removal proceedings 
into one final petition for review of a final order in the 
court of appeals.”  (emphasis added)), aff ’d, 533 U.S. 
348 (2001).  
The government’s contention that § 1252(b)(9) bars 
review thus is without merit.  
C. 
Next, the government contends that judicial review 
is foreclosed under the APA because the decision to re-
scind DACA is committed to agency discretion by law.  
We do not agree.  
“Although there is a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of 
judicial review of agency action,” Speed Mining, Inc. v. 
Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.3d 
310, 316 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. 
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)), the 
APA bars judicial review of agency action “committed to 
agency discretion by law.”  5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).  The 
government says that the Acting Secretary’s decision to 
rescind DACA is a type of agency enforcement decision 
that is presumptively unreviewable under the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 
(1985).8  Invoking the “broad discretion exercised by 
                                                 
8  The government doesn’t appear to seriously contest that Plain-
tiffs’ procedural APA claim challenging the decision to rescind 
DACA is subject to judicial review.  Accord Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 
182, 195-98 (1993) (process by which an agency makes a rule may be 
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immigration officials” that is a “principal feature of the 
removal system,” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396, the govern-
ment urges that the concerns driving Chaney’s pre-
sumption of unreviewability apply with “particular force” 
in the removal context, a context in which allowing delay 
would result in ordering the government to allow a “con-
tinuing violation” of federal law, AAADC, 525 U.S. at 490.  
And while conceding that an agency’s expression of a 
legal interpretation announced in a broad or general en-
forcement policy may be reviewable, the government 
says that the decision to rescind DACA is distinguisha-
ble because it rested on discretionary enforcement con-
cerns and expressed the Department of Homeland Se-
curity’s view about the scope of its enforcement author-
ity, not the substantive unlawfulness of the policy.  Fi-
nally, relying on the Supreme Court’s post-Chaney de-
cision in ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs (“BLE”),  
482 U.S. 270 (1987), the government argues that, even if 
the sole rationale for the rescission decision was the 
view that DACA was unlawful, such rationale cannot 
provide a “hook” to support review of the decision.   
Because the government relies so heavily on Chaney 
for its argument, we turn to that decision.  There, a 
group of death row inmates petitioned the Food and 
Drug Administration to prevent the use in lethal injec-
tions of certain drugs that the agency had not approved 
for that purpose.  470 U.S. at 823-24.  The agency re-
fused to act, based on its view that its jurisdiction to act 
under the substantive law was unclear and, even if it had 
jurisdiction, it would decline to exercise that jurisdiction 
                                                 
reviewed for compliance with applicable procedural requirements, 
regardless of reviewability of the substance of the rule).  
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under its inherent discretion to do so.  Id. at 824-25.  
The petitioners filed suit, seeking an order directing the 
agency to act.  Id. at 825.  
Without addressing the jurisdictional issue, the 
Court held that the agency’s discretionary decision not 
to enforce the substantive law was unreviewable under 
the APA.  Id. at 828, 837-38.  As the Court explained, 
such decisions “often involve[] a complicated balancing 
of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the 
agency’s] expertise,” including “whether agency re-
sources are best spent on this violation or another, 
whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, [and] 
whether the particular enforcement action  . . .  best 
fits the agency’s overall policies.”  Id. at 831.  
Nonenforcement decisions, the Court observed, gen-
erally do not involve the exercise of “coercive power over 
an individual’s liberty or property rights,” and, accord-
ingly, do “not infringe upon areas that courts often are 
called upon to protect.”  Id. at 832.  Such decisions 
also “share[] to some extent the characteristics of the 
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to 
indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the 
special province of the Executive Branch.”  Id.  For 
these reasons, the Court found, such decisions have 
“traditionally been committed to agency discretion,” 
and Congress, in “enacting the APA[,] did not intend to 
alter that tradition.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, the Court concluded, “an agency’s deci-
sion not to take enforcement action should be presumed 
immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2).”  Id.  
Here, however, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity’s decision to rescind DACA is not a “Chaney-type 
enforcement action[].”  Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 
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1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996).  For starters, the Acting 
Secretary did not exercise her discretion in an individual 
case.9  Nor did she identify a violation of the INA against 
which to act, determine whether government resources 
would be best spent enforcing one violation over an-
other, or decide whether the Department would succeed 
if it pursued a particular violation.  Rather, Acting Sec-
retary Duke rescinded a general enforcement policy in 
existence for over five years and affecting hundreds of 
thousands of enrollees based on the view that the policy 
was unlawful.  
Major agency policy decisions are “quite different 
from day-to-day agency []enforcement decisions.”  Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union v. Horner, 854 F.2d 490, 496 
(D.C. Cir. 1988).  Where an agency expresses a broad 
or general enforcement policy, different considerations 
than those driving Chaney’s presumption are at play.  
“As general statements, they are more likely to be direct 
interpretations of the commands of the substantive stat-
ute rather than the sort of mingled assessments of fact, 
policy, and law that drive an individual enforcement de-
cision and that are, as Chaney recognizes, peculiarly 
within the agency’s expertise and discretion.”  Crowley 
Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 677  
(D.C. Cir. 1994).  
                                                 
9  The government correctly observes that an agency’s discretion-
ary decision to enforce the law may be unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).  
See Speed Mining, 528 F.3d at 311, 317-18 (holding agency’s discre-
tionary decision to enforce substantive law by issuing citations for 
safety violations was committed to agency discretion and therefore 
unreviewable).  But Speed Mining is distinguishable because it in-
volved a discretionary enforcement decision in an individual case. 
21a 
Accordingly, as courts have recognized, an agency’s 
expression of a broad or general enforcement policy 
based on the agency’s legal interpretation is subject  
to review.  OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States,  
132 F.3d 808, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding courts had 
jurisdiction under APA because challenged agency ac-
tion was a general policy of refusing to enforce provision 
of substantive law and not a “single-shot non-enforcement 
decision” (citing Crowley, 37 F.3d at 674-76)); see Ken-
ney, 96 F.3d at 1123-24 (concluding Chaney applies to 
“individual, case-by-base determinations of when to en-
force existing [law] rather than permanent policies or 
standards” and did not encompass agency’s adoption of 
general policies stating standards agency deemed ac-
ceptable to implement statutory goals); Crowley, 37 F.3d 
at 672-73, 675 (Chaney’s presumption applies if “agency 
bases its refusal to enforce in an individual case solely 
on a legal interpretation without explicitly relying on its 
enforcement discretion”); see also Edison Elec. Inst. v. 
EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding chal-
lenge to agency’s interpretation of law and regulations 
advanced in enforcement policy statement was “not the 
type of discretionary judgment concerning the alloca-
tion of enforcement resources that [Chaney] shields 
from judicial review”); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA,  
980 F.2d 765, 767, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding Chaney’s 
presumption “is inapplicable or at least rebutted [where 
plaintiff  ] raise[d] a facial challenge to the [agency’s] 
statutory interpretation embodied in [a regulation] and 
d[id] not contest a particular enforcement decision” and 
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citing authority in support).  DACA’s rescission fits well 
within this rubric.10  
The government attempts to distinguish this author-
ity, but its efforts are unavailing.  It claims DACA’s re-
scission involved discretionary balancing because it was 
based on concerns about its legality and “litigation risk,” 
a term that appears to refer to the likelihood the policy 
would have been invalidated had it been challenged in 
the Texas litigation.  But the Rescission Memo doesn’t 
identify the “risk” of litigation as a “consideration” on 
which the Acting Secretary relied in rescinding the pol-
icy.  Rather, the Memo relies on the Attorney Gen-
eral’s conclusion that DACA needed to be rescinded be-
cause it was unlawful.11  True, the Attorney General’s 
letter also proffers the conclusion that “potentially im-
minent litigation” would invalidate DACA, as was the 
case with DAPA in the Texas litigation.  But we agree 
with the determination of our district court colleague 
Judge Bates in his opinion resolving challenges to 
DACA’s rescission that this justification “was too closely 
bound up with [the Attorney General’s] evaluation of 
DACA’s legality,” NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 234, and 
                                                 
10 Our dissenting colleague contends that decisions from the D.C. 
Circuit supporting our view that DACA’s rescission is reviewable 
don’t explain how they can be reconciled with Chaney.  Dis. op. at 
48-51.  We disagree.  See Crowley, 37 F.3d at 675-77; Nat’l Wild-
life Fed’n, 980 F.2d at 772-73.  
11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (“[D]etermination[s] and ruling[s] by 
the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be 
controlling [on the Secretary of Homeland Security].”); see Yanez-
Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 n.6 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding At-
torney General’s position controlling where Department of Home-
land Security and Attorney General had conflicting views about ap-
plicability of a legal doctrine).   
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thus cuts against Chaney’s presumption of unreviewa-
bility. 
Nor are we persuaded by the government’s claim 
that DACA’s rescission rested on the Department’s view 
of the scope of its enforcement authority, not the sub-
stantive unlawfulness of the policy.  As Judge Bates 
aptly noted when presented with the same argument, 
“this strikes the [c]ourt as a distinction without a differ-
ence.  To say that a particular agency action is ‘without 
statutory authority’ is simply to say that no statutory 
provision authorizes that action; in a sense, therefore, it 
is a determination of the substantive content of each 
statutory provision that might plausibly apply.”  Id. at 
232.  We, like Judge Bates, “fail[] to perceive any mean-
ingful difference between an agency’s conclusion that it 
lacks statutory authority and its interpretation of a spe-
cific statutory provision.”  Id.12  
                                                 
12  Our dissenting colleague notes that Acting Secretary Duke 
didn’t say in the Rescission Memo “that DACA must be terminated 
or that she lacked the legal authority to enforce DACA or a DACA-
like program.”  Dis. op. at 54.  It is true that Acting Secretary Duke 
wrote only that it was clear DACA “should” be terminated.  J.A. 
383.  Standing alone, however, “should” can express the notion of 
requirement or obligation.  Should, Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary Unabridged (2002) (“used  . . .  to express duty, 
obligation, [or] necessity”).  Given the Attorney General’s evalua-
tion of DACA’s legality and the absence of any reference to litigation 
risk in the Rescission Memo’s list of considerations, this use of the 
word “should” supports our conclusion, ante, at 20, 22, that the Sec-
retary rescinded DACA based on her view that the policy was un-
lawful.  Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s view, our decision 
today does not intrude on discretionary prerogatives of the Execu-
tive Branch (see Dis. op. at 50-52); rather, it “preserves the judici-
ary’s role as the ultimate arbiter of statutory meaning while at the 
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The government also relies on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in BLE as further support for the view that 
Plaintiffs’ claims are unreviewable.  But there, the Su-
preme Court held only that “where a party petitions an 
agency for reconsideration on the ground of material er-
ror, i.e., on the same record that was before the agency 
when it rendered its original decision, an order which 
merely denies rehearing of the prior order is not itself 
reviewable.”  482 U.S. at 280 (internal quotation marks, 
ellipsis, and alteration omitted).  The government is 
correct that the Court also rejected the principle that, if 
an “agency gives a ‘reviewable’ reason for otherwise un-
reviewable action, the action becomes reviewable,” cit-
ing as an example a prosecutor’s refusal to institute crim-
inal proceedings based on the belief that the law will not 
sustain a conviction.  Id. at 283.  But BLE still does 
not advance the government’s argument.  
For one thing, Plaintiffs here filed a timely challenge 
to the government’s original decision to rescind DACA. 
BLE doesn’t bar review of that type of challenge.  More-
over, as the government itself concedes, Appellees’ Open-
ing & Response Br. at 19, BLE addressed the scope of ju-
dicial review in the context of agency non-enforcement ac-
tion in an individual case.  See Crowley, 37 F.3d at 675-
77 (explaining the basis for distinguishing—for pur-
poses of judicial review—between individual enforce-
                                                 
same time affording agencies breathing space to adopt enforcement 
policies for discretionary reasons,” NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 234.  
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ment decisions and implementation of broad enforce-
ment policies).  DACA’s rescission involves a broad en-
forcement policy, not an individual decision.13  
In sum, we hold that Plaintiffs’ claims are reviewable.14  
III. 
A. 
We turn now to the merits and consider first whether 
the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
to the government on Plaintiffs’ procedural APA claim.  
The court determined that DACA’s rescission was akin 
to a policy statement and thus was not subject to notice 
and comment under the APA.  Casa, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 
772.  We review this determination de novo.  Children’s 
Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar (“CHKD”), 
896 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 2018).  
                                                 
13 We accept that agency action doesn’t become reviewable simply 
because “the agency gives a ‘reviewable’ reason for otherwise unre-
viewable action.”  BLE, 482 U.S. at 283.  But, as we’ve explained, 
DACA’s rescission is not such an unreviewable decision.  See 
NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 231 (“[A]n otherwise reviewable inter-
pretation of a statute does not become presumptively unreviewable 
simply because the agency characterizes it as an exercise of enforce-
ment discretion.”). 
14 The government has not cross-appealed from the district court’s 
additional determination that all Plaintiffs had standing, Casa,  
284 F. Supp. 3d at 771, and the parties have not briefed this issue on 
appeal.  Nonetheless, reviewing this issue de novo, Bostic, 760 F.3d 
at 370, we agree with the district court that the individual DACA 
recipient Plaintiffs have standing to sue.  We consequently need 
not consider whether the other Plaintiffs have standing.  See id. at 
370-71. 
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The APA generally requires that agencies provide 
notice of proposals to create, amend, or repeal a rule15 
and an opportunity for interested persons to comment 
on the proposal.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(5), 553(a)-(c).  
“Rules issued through the notice-and-comment process 
are often referred to as legislative rules because they 
have the force and effect of law.”  Perez v. Mortg. Bank-
ers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “[T]he APA provides[, however,] that, 
unless another statute states otherwise, the notice-and-
comment requirement ‘does not apply’ to ‘interpretative 
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice.’  ”  Id. at 1203-04 
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)).  
Plaintiffs argue that DACA’s rescission required no-
tice and comment under the APA because the Rescission 
Memo is a legislative rule that mandates how Depart-
ment officials must act and substantively affects DACA 
recipients.  The government rejects this premise, coun-
tering that the Memo is a general statement of policy.  
We agree with the government.16  
 
                                                 
15 The parties don’t dispute that DACA’s rescission qualifies as a 
“rule” for APA purposes.  See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
16 Accord Regents, 908 F.3d at 512-14 (holding DACA’s rescission 
is not a binding rule of substantive law); NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 
237 (“[T]he rescission of DACA was exempt from notice and com-
ment as a general statement of agency policy.”); Batalla Vidal  
v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 270-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing 
notice-and-comment claims because Rescission Memo is not a legis-
lative rule), appeals docketed, Nos. 18-1521, 18-1525, 18-1986 (2d Cir. 
May 21 & July 5, 2018). 
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The critical question in distinguishing between legis-
lative rules and general statements of policy is whether 
the statement “is of present binding effect; if it is, then 
the APA calls for notice and comment.”  Elec. Privacy 
Info. Ctr. v. DHS (“EPIC”), 653 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). 
“[S]ubstantive or legislative rule[s], pursuant to prop-
erly delegated authority, ha[ve] the force of law, and 
create[] new law or impose[] new rights or duties.”  
CHKD, 896 F.3d at 620 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see Nat’l Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 
788 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“A valid legislative rule is binding 
upon all persons, and on the courts, to the same extent 
as a congressional statute.”).  “To that end, a rule is 
legislative if it supplements a statute, adopts a new po-
sition inconsistent with existing regulations, or other-
wise effects a substantive change in existing law or pol-
icy.”  CHKD, 896 F.3d at 620 (internal quotation marks 
and alteration omitted).  
By contrast, general statements of policy “advise the 
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency 
proposes to exercise a discretionary power.”  Vigil,  
508 U.S. at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A 
directive that doesn’t establish a “binding norm” and 
leaves agency officials free to exercise their discretion 
qualifies as a general statement of policy.  Chen Zhou 
Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1341 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing 
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 
1987), and Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 
1015 (9th Cir. 1987)).  
The Rescission Memo removes a mechanism under 
which individuals could receive deferred action but places 
“no limitations” on other lawful enforcement prerogatives 
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of the Department of Homeland Security.  J.A. 384.  
As the district court observed, Casa, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 
772, the Memo doesn’t curtail the Department’s discre-
tion to make deferred action available on a case-by-case 
or ad hoc basis.  Nor does the Memo, by its terms, cre-
ate “right[s] or benefit[s]” enforceable “by any party.”  
J.A. 384.  
Additionally, although DACA was rescinded based on 
the government’s view that the policy was unlawful, the 
Rescission Memo doesn’t bind subsequent Secretaries 
who might disagree with this reasoning or bar the De-
partment from implementing other deferred action pol-
icies in the future.  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, 
the Memo doesn’t “replace[] agency discretion with a new 
binding rule of substantive law,” Mada-Luna, 813 F.2d 
at 1014 (internal quotation marks omitted), affecting the 
rights of people regulated by the Department, see EPIC, 
653 F.3d at 7 (agency’s statement “cast in mandatory 
language so the affected private parties are reasonably 
led to believe that failure to conform will bring adverse 
consequences” qualifies as binding on those subject to it 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  It therefore falls 
on the policy “end of the spectrum,” CHKD, 896 F.3d at 
620-21 (internal quotation marks omitted), and thus was 
exempt from notice and comment under the APA.  
B. 
We consider next whether the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment to the government on 
Plaintiffs’ claim that DACA’s rescission is substantively 





The APA requires a reviewing court to “hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action  . . .  found to be  . . .  
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  
These “criteria render our oversight highly deferential, 
with a presumption in favor of finding the agency action 
valid.”  Friends of Back Bay v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 681 F.3d 581, 587 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  This standard, however, “does not 
reduce judicial review to a rubber stamp of agency ac-
tion.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Ra-
ther, “we must engage in a searching and careful inquiry 
of the [administrative] record, so that we may consider 
whether the agency considered the relevant factors and 
whether a clear error of judgment was made.”  Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  Where agency action 
qualifies as “unreasonable as a matter of law, it is likely 
to have been arbitrary and capricious.”  Id. (citing 
Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 n.23 
(1989)).  “We evaluate [this issue] de novo[.]”  Id.  
To comply with § 706(2)(A), an agency “must examine 
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explana-
tion for its action including a rational connection be-
tween the facts found and the choice made.”  Motor Ve-
hicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  The giving of “ade-
quate reasons” for an agency’s decision is “[o]ne of the 
basic procedural requirements of administrative rule-
making.”  Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 
2117, 2125 (2016).  In a challenge under § 706(2)(A), “an 
agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis ar-
ticulated by the agency itself.”  State Farm, 463 U.S. 
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at 50; see Jimenez-Cedillo v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 292, 299 
(4th Cir. 2018) (“[A] reviewing court may not speculate 
on reasons that might have supported a change in 
agency position []or supply a reasoned basis for the 
agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”  
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
An agency satisfactorily explains a decision when it 
provides “enough clarity that its ‘path may reasonably 
be discerned.’  ”  Jimenez-Cedillo, 885 F.3d at 297 (quo-
ting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight 
Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).  If the agency pro-
vides such an explanation, “we will uphold its decision.”  
Id. at 297-98.  “But where the agency has failed to pro-
vide even that minimal level of analysis, its action is ar-
bitrary and capricious and so cannot carry the force of 
law.”  Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125.  
These principles apply with equal force to a change 
in agency position.  Jimenez-Cedillo, 885 F.3d at 298.  
Thus, in changing policies, agencies “must ‘provide a rea-
soned explanation for the change.’ ”  Id. (quoting Encino 
Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125).  “At a minimum, an 
agency must ‘display awareness that it is changing posi-
tion and show that there are good reasons for the new 
policy.’  ”  Id. (quoting Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 
2126).  The agency’s explanation must address the “facts 
and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by 
the prior policy,” including any “serious reliance inter-
ests.”  Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (quoting 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-
16 (2009)).  “An ‘unexplained inconsistency’ in agency 
policy indicates that the agency’s action is arbitrary and 
capricious, and therefore unlawful.”  Jimenez-Cedillo, 
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885 F.3d at 298 (quoting Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. 
at 2125).  
2. 
Plaintiffs argue that DACA’s rescission was arbi-
trary and capricious because the Department of Home-
land Security failed to give a reasoned explanation for 
the change in policy, particularly given the significant 
reliance interests involved.  We agree.17 
As we have explained, DACA was rescinded based on 
the Department’s view that the policy was unlawful.  
But neither the Attorney General’s September 4 letter 
nor the Department’s Rescission Memo identify any 
statutory provision with which the DACA policy con-
flicts.  Cf. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2127 (reject-
ing as insufficient agency statement regarding statutory 
exemption proffered in support of policy change where 
agency did not “analyze or explain” why statute should 
be interpreted as agency suggested).  
The Attorney General’s letter does mention that the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction against the DAPA 
policy on “multiple legal grounds” in the Texas litiga-
tion, J.A. 379, and the Rescission Memo cites to this rul-
ing.  The Fifth Circuit’s ruling was based in part on its 
determination that the DAPA policy likely ran counter 
to the INA’s “intricate process for illegal aliens to derive 
a lawful immigration classification from their children’s 
immigration status.”  Texas, 809 F.3d at 179.  There 
                                                 
17 Plaintiffs also assert that (1) the district court failed to consider 
evidence of “bad faith” and “animus” underlying the decision to re-
scind DACA presented in their complaint and (2) the Department’s 
conclusions about DACA’s legality are substantively incorrect.  
Given our disposition, we decline to address these arguments. 
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is no dispute here, however, that “DACA has no ana-
logue in the INA.”  NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 239 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  Further, as the Fifth 
Circuit explained in reaching its conclusion, “DACA and 
DAPA are not identical.”  Texas, 809 F.3d at 174.  
The Attorney General’s letter also asserts that DACA 
suffered from the same “constitutional defects that the 
courts recognized as to DAPA.”  J.A. 379.  The courts in 
the Texas litigation, however, did not address constitu-
tional claims.  And while the Attorney General urged 
in his letter that his office had a duty to “defend the Con-
stitution” and “faithfully execute the laws passed by Con-
gress,” J.A. 379, he does not explain how allowing the 
DACA policy to remain in effect would violate that duty.  
The Attorney General’s letter and the Rescission 
Memo also proffer the concern—based on the Attorney 
General’s determination that the DAPA and DACA pol-
icies share the same legal defects—that “potentially im-
minent” litigation would result in a ruling in the Texas 
litigation enjoining DACA.  Entirely absent, however, 
is an explanation why it was likely that the district court 
in the Texas litigation would have enjoined DACA.  
Further, the 2014 OLC Opinion outlining the Depart-
ment’s authority to implement the DAPA policy identi-
fied “from the nature of the Take Care duty” at least 
“four general  . . .  principles governing the permis-
sible scope of enforcement discretion,” J.A. 137-38;  
2014 WL 10788677, at *5-6, and noted that concerns “an-
imating DACA were  . . .  consistent with the types 
of concerns that have customarily guided the exercise of 
immigration enforcement discretion,” J.A. 149 n.8; 2014 
WL 10788677, at *13 n.8.  
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The point is that the Department had before it at the 
time it rescinded DACA a reasoned analysis from the 
office tasked with providing legal advice to all executive 
branch agencies that supported the policy’s legality.  
Yet the Department changed course without any expla-
nation for why that analysis was faulty.  Cf. Fox Tele-
vision Stations, 556 U.S. at 516 (“[A] reasoned explana-
tion is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances 
that underlay  . . .  the prior policy.”).  
Nor did the Department adequately account for the 
reliance interests that would be affected by its decision. 
Hundreds of thousands of people had structured their 
lives on the availability of deferred action during the 
over five years between the implementation of DACA 
and the decision to rescind.  Although the government 
insists that Acting Secretary Duke18 considered these 
interests in connection with her decision to rescind 
DACA, her Memo makes no mention of them. 
Accordingly, we hold that the Department’s decision 
to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious and must 
be set aside. 
IV. 
We turn next to the district court’s rulings (1) grant-
ing summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the portion of 
their estoppel claim pertaining to sharing of DACA ap-
plicant information, and (2) ordering the government to 
                                                 
18 The government urges us to consider the June 2018 memoran-
dum from former Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen 
belatedly proffered by the government as a basis for upholding 
DACA’s rescission.  We decline to do so because the memorandum 
was not part of the administrative record in this appeal.  Fla. Power 
& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985).   
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comply with the information-sharing policies promul-
gated in 2012 and enjoining it from altering those policies. 
“Equitable estoppel is a well-established concept in-
voked by courts to aid a party who, in good faith, has 
relied, to his detriment, upon the representations of an-
other.”  United States ex rel. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. 
Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 402 F.2d 893, 897 (4th Cir. 1968) 
(internal footnote omitted).  To establish equitable es-
toppel, “[i]t is only necessary to show that the person 
[sought to be] estopped, by  . . .  statements or con-
duct, misled another to his prejudice.”  Id. at 898 (quot-
ing United States ex rel. Noland Co. v. Wood, 99 F.2d 
80, 82 (4th Cir. 1938)).  As against the government, “es-
toppel may only be justified, if ever, in the presence of 
affirmative misconduct by government agents.”  Daw-
kins v. Witt, 318 F.3d 606, 611 (4th Cir. 2003). 
In enjoining the government, the district court deter-
mined that estoppel “potentially would apply to any use 
for immigration enforcement of the information collected  
. . .  during DACA registrations” because “the Govern-
ment promised not to transfer or use the information gath-
ered from [DACA applicants] for immigration enforce-
ment.”  Casa, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 778.  
 We disagree with the district court.  The government 
did not make such a promise or suggest in any other way 
that its policies governing the sharing of information pro-
vided by DACA applicants would never change.  Rather, 
the government warned DACA applicants that informa-
tion they provided could be used for immigration enforce-
ment where criteria for commencement of removal pro-
ceedings or referral to law enforcement for a determina-
tion whether to commence such proceedings were met.  
It also warned that its policies governing the sharing of 
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applicant information could be “modified, superseded, or 
rescinded at any time without notice” and created no 
“right or benefit.”  J.A. 1004.  In view of these clear and 
unequivocal warnings, Plaintiffs could not reasonably be-
lieve that the information they provided as part of their 
DACA application would never be used for immigration 
enforcement purposes.  Cf. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc. 
v. United States, 367 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Equi-
table estoppel requires reasonable reliance.”).  Plaintiffs’ 
equitable estoppel claim thus necessarily fails. 
V. 
 We turn finally to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, 
which were dismissed by the district court.  We decline 
to decide whether DACA’s rescission violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process and equal protection guaran-
tees under the “well established principle governing the 
prudent exercise of this [c]ourt’s jurisdiction that normally 
the [c]ourt will not decide a constitutional question if there 
is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.”  
Escambia Cty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per 
curiam).  Because we have determined that DACA’s re-
scission violates the APA, we need go no further.  See, 
e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 265 (5th Cir. 2016).  
 We also decline to decide whether Plaintiffs’ Fifth 
Amendment rights were violated by the policies an-
nounced on September 5, 2017, regarding the shar- 
ing of personal information from DACA applicants. 19  
McMillan, 466 U.S. at 51.  Our decision today restores 
DACA to its pre-September 5, 2017, status, rendering a 
                                                 
19  Although the district court found Plaintiffs’ due process  
claims lacked merit, its analysis addressed DACA’s rescission, not 
information-sharing.  Casa, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 775-77. 
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nullity the information-sharing policies announced on 
September 5.  It therefore is unnecessary to address 
Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to these policies.  See 
Veasey, 830 F.3d at 265.20 
VI. 
 To sum up:  We affirm the district court’s rulings 
that Plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable and that DACA’s 
rescission did not require notice and comment under the 
APA.  We reverse the district court’s ruling sustaining 
the rescission of the policy as valid under 5 U.S.C.  
§ 706(2)(A).  DACA’s rescission is vacated as arbitrary 
and capricious, and the matter is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We reverse 
the district court’s ruling finding Plaintiffs entitled to 
injunctive relief on equitable estoppel grounds, reverse 
the grant of summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor, and 
vacate the injunction. Because we find it unnecessary to 
decide Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to DACA’s 
rescission and the related changes to the Department’s  
 
 
                                                 
20 Plaintiffs also contend that the district court misapplied Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56 by failing to (1) afford them a reasonable opportunity for 
discovery on their claims, (2) consider or address their statement of 
material facts in dispute, and (3) view the facts in the light most fa-
vorable to them.  They allege further that the district court misap-
plied the APA by granting summary judgment to the government 
without addressing their contention that the administrative record 
was incomplete and by failing to consider evidence of “bad faith and 
improper behavior” by government officials.  Given our disposition, 
we find it unnecessary to address these issues. 
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policies governing use of information provided by DACA 
applicants, we vacate the district court’s judgment on 
these issues and dismiss those claims.  
AFFIRMED IN PART,  
REVERSED IN PART,  
VACATED IN PART,  




RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part:  
 The plaintiffs ask this Court to invalidate the rescis-
sion of DACA, a seven-year-old program explained at its 
inception as an act of prosecutorial discretion.  The Ma-
jority’s opinion grants this request, reasoning that the 
Department of Homeland Security behaved in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner by giving what my good 
colleagues decide are faulty legal reasons for rescinding 
the discretionary policy.  
 I disagree with the premise that the Administrative 
Procedure Act permits this review of the Executive 
Branch’s rescission of DACA.  Enforcement discretion 
lies at the heart of executive power.  The Executive 
may decide to prosecute, or not prosecute, an individual 
or a group so long as the reasons for that decision are 
constitutionally sound and the decision does not violate 
or abdicate the Executive’s statutory duties.  Here, the 
Executive’s proper exercise of that discretion to rescind 
DACA is judicially unreviewable under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, regardless of one’s view of the policy 
questions underlying DACA.  To hold otherwise per-
mits the Judicial Branch to invade the province of the 
Executive and impair the carefully constructed separa-
tion of powers laid out in our Constitution.  
I.  Background 
 The Secretary of Homeland Security is charged by 
statute with enforcing the nation’s immigration laws.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a); 6 U.S.C. § 202(5).  Among those 
responsibilities is removing individuals subject to re-
moval under federal law.  See Arizona v. United States, 
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567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012).  “A principal feature of the re-
moval system is the broad discretion exercised by immi-
gration officials.”  Id.  At each stage of the process—
from investigation to execution of a removal order—the 
Secretary has the discretion to pursue removal or for-
bear doing so.  Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).  
 The Secretary has used this discretion to prioritize 
the removal of certain categories of aliens and depriori-
tize others.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meiss-
ner, Commissioner, Dep’t of Justice, Immigration & 
Naturalization Service, “Exercising Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion” 7-9 (Nov. 17, 2000) (deprioritizing the removal 
of aliens who, for instance, resided in the United States 
for a long time, had little to no criminal history, and had 
greater ties to the United States than another country); 
Memorandum from John Morton, Director, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
“Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with 
the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the 
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal 
of Aliens” 2 (June 17, 2011) (deprioritizing the removal 
of veterans, minors, elderly individuals, pregnant women, 
and various other groups).  On top of these general, de-
partment-wide enforcement policies, individual agents 
have been empowered to exercise enforcement discre-
tion based on specific circumstances.  See, e.g., Meiss-
ner Memorandum at 1-2.  Just as a highway patrolman 
has discretion whether to pull over a given driver (and 
even after pulling someone over, whether to give that 
person a ticket), immigration agents can weigh individ-
ual and country-specific humanitarian circumstances 
when deciding whether to exercise their prosecutorial 
discretion.  See Morton Memorandum at 4. 
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 Relying on this broad enforcement discretion to set 
enforcement priorities and to guide agents in rendering 
their individualized enforcement decisions, the Secre-
tary of Homeland Security established the DACA pro-
gram. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., “Exercising Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the 
United States as Children” (June 15, 2012).  DACA au-
thorized agents to grant deferred action1 to certain peo-
ple brought illegally to the United States as children.  
Under DACA, aliens who applied and satisfied certain 
gateway criteria were “granted” or “denied” deferred 
action, ostensibly on an individualized, case-by-case ba-
sis.  Id.  Even when granted, deferred action could be 
revoked unilaterally by the Department.  See AAADC, 
525 U.S. at 484-85.  The DACA memorandum stated 
expressly that it conferred upon recipients of deferred 
action “no substantive right, immigration status or path-
way to citizenship.”  Napolitano Memorandum at 3.  
 Two years later, the Secretary expanded DACA by 
loosening some restrictions and extending the period of 
deferred action from two years to three.  Memoran-
dum from Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., “Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Re-
moval of Undocumented Immigrants” (Nov. 20, 2014).  
In the same action, the Secretary also created a new en-
forcement policy, known as “DAPA,” extending “deferred 
action, on a case-by-case basis,” to parents of American 
citizens and lawful permanent residents.  Id. at 4.  
                                                 
1  “Deferred action” means “an act of administrative convenience 
to the government which gives some cases lower priority.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 274a.12(c)(14). 
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 Led by Texas, a coalition of states challenged this 
new policy in federal court, arguing that DAPA (and the 
DACA expansion) violated the Administrative Proce-
dure Act as well as the President’s Article II duty to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3.  The district court preliminarily en-
joined DAPA, holding that the Department had “legis-
lated a substantive rule without complying with the pro-
cedural requirements under the” APA.  Texas v. United 
States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015).  The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the 
Department had promulgated DAPA in violation of the 
APA and that it was “manifestly contrary” to the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  Texas v. United 
States, 809 F.3d 134, 182 (5th Cir. 2015).2 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and directed 
the parties to brief not only the issues decided by the 
Fifth Circuit, but also whether “the Guidance violates 
the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 3.” 
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016).  But after 
oral argument, the Fifth Circuit decision was summarily 
affirmed by an equally divided Court.  United States v. 
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). 
 In response, the Secretary rescinded the enjoined 
DAPA program and DACA expansion.  Memorandum 
from John Kelly, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
“Rescission of November 20, 2014 Memorandum” (June 
                                                 
2  In finding DAPA subject to review under the APA, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that deferred action “is much more than nonenforcement.”  
Texas, 809 F.3d at 166.  The court reasoned that since recipients are 
conferred “lawful presence” and may receive associated benefits such 
as driver’s licenses and unemployment insurance, deferred action was 
not an exercise of enforcement discretion.  Id. at 168, 168 n.108.   
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15, 2017).  And several months later, after Texas threat-
ened to challenge the original DACA policy, the Acting 
Secretary similarly rescinded DACA.  Memorandum 
from Elaine Duke, Acting Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., “Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum” 
(Sept. 5, 2017).  
 In justifying her decision to rescind DACA, the Act-
ing Secretary referred to the Supreme Court and Fifth 
Circuit decisions in the DAPA litigation.  She also re-
lied on a letter from the Attorney General that asserted 
that because DACA “has the same legal and constitu-
tional defects that the courts recognized as to DAPA, it 
is likely that potentially imminent litigation would yield 
similar results with respect to DACA.”  Id. at 3-4.  The 
Acting Secretary nonetheless ordered that DACA be 
wound down in stages over a six-month period.  Id.  
II.  Administrative Procedure Act Review 
 The plaintiffs primarily contend that the rescission of 
DACA violates the APA.  Because I find that immigra-
tion enforcement decisions are committed to the discre-
tion of the Department, I part with my colleagues and 
conclude that the rescission of DACA is judicially unre-
viewable under the APA.3 
A. Discretionary enforcement decisions are presumptively 
unreviewable.  
 The APA regulates the decisionmaking process of 
federal agencies.  As such, the statute provides for the 
judicial review of a “final agency action for which there 
is no other adequate remedy in court.”  5 U.S.C. § 704.  
                                                 
3  The plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are, of course, reviewable, 
and I address them separately below. 
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Even so, the statute does not permit review of agency 
action that “is committed to agency discretion by law.”  
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).  This provision applies to a variety 
of agency decisions that are unsuitable for judicial re-
view.  See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993); 
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 410 (1971).  One essential category of decisions “gen-
erally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion” con-
sists of enforcement decisions, both in the civil and crim-
inal arenas.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).  
 Discretion in prosecutorial enforcement is deeply 
rooted in the Constitution’s separation of powers.  See, 
e.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 
2013); Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor,  
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 537-63 (2005).  Indeed, the 
division of labor with respect to enforcement is among 
the most critical protections the Constitution affords:  
The Executive Branch decides whether and when to 
begin enforcement actions while the Judicial Branch ad-
judicates the government’s claims.  This division re-
flects the Framers’ recognition that, “in the long term, 
structural protections against abuse of power were crit-
ical to preserving liberty.”  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 730 (1986).  
 Encroachment by the judiciary into enforcement de-
cisions upsets this constitutional balance.  If judges 
could decide which cases to prosecute, that would com-
bine the role of prosecutor and judge in one branch of 
government, seriously risking individual liberty.  See 
In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003); 
see also 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
LAWS 154 (Thomas Nugent trans., 6th ed. 1792) (“[T]here 
is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated 
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from the legislative and executive.”).  And if the judici-
ary could decide which meritorious cases not to prose-
cute, that would improperly divest the President, who 
unlike judges is elected by the people, of the executive 
authority that the Constitution affords to protect public 
safety and enhance public welfare.  Thus, in “the ordi-
nary case, ‘so long as the prosecutor has probable cause 
to believe that the accused committed an offense defined 
by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and 
what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, gener-
ally rests entirely in his discretion.’  ”  United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Borden-
kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)); see also 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he 
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute 
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”).  
The judiciary’s role is to protect individuals by properly 
adjudicating the charges against them—for example, by 
dismissing meritless enforcement actions after they are 
filed.  It is normally neither appropriate nor necessary 
for judges to involve themselves in the decision to bring, 
or not to bring, enforcement actions.  
 Though perhaps more often discussed in the criminal 
context, this broad enforcement discretion also encom-
passes civil enforcement decisions.  See Speed Mining, 
Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety, 528 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 
2008); see also Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Mill-
ing Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 448 (1979).  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that the concerns that counsel 
against reviewing criminal enforcement decisions are 
even stronger in the context of immigration removal de-
cisions.  AAADC, 525 U.S. at 490 (noting that the “sys-
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temic costs” of judicial supervision of enforcement deci-
sions are “greatly magnified in the deportation context”); 
see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976).  
 The nature of civil enforcement discretion led the Su-
preme Court in Heckler v. Chaney to hold that an agency’s 
nonenforcement decision was presumptively unreviewa-
ble under the APA.  In that case, the Food and Drug 
Administration refused to take civil enforcement action 
against a class of drug manufacturers and others who 
produced and distributed drugs used by states to per-
form executions.  The FDA explained its decision not 
to institute any enforcement action as a product of con-
cerns that it lacked jurisdiction to address the use of 
drugs in such a way.  Yet even if it could, the FDA 
noted that it would decline to exercise jurisdiction over 
those manufacturers under its inherent enforcement 
discretion.  The Court found the decision to be pre-
sumptively unreviewable under the APA because agency 
enforcement decisions “involve[] a complicated balanc-
ing of a number of factors,” like allocating resources and 
prioritizing policies, that “are peculiarly within [the 
FDA’s] expertise” and are thus generally unsuitable for 
judicial review.  Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831; cf. Wayte v. 
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (noting that the 
factors that underlie prosecution decisions are of the 
type that courts are not competent to evaluate).  
 While civil enforcement decisions are presumptively 
unreviewable, Congress can overcome that presumption 
by “circumscrib[ing] agency enforcement discretion” 
through a substantive statute.  Chaney, 470 U.S. at 834; 
see also id. at 830 (noting that judicial review is unavail-
able under the APA if the statute provides “no judicially 
manageable standards  . . .  for judging how and 
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when an agency should exercise its discretion”).  In 
this way, Congress retains the ability to restrict the Ex-
ecutive’s enforcement discretion.  In Chaney, to decide 
whether the FDA was so restricted, the Court examined 
the relevant statutory provisions and determined that 
the statutes provided no dictate about when enforce-
ment discretion must be exercised.  Since the FDA’s 
enforcement discretion was both statutorily authorized 
and unconstrained, the Court held that the enforcement 
decision was not subject to APA review.  
 Chaney also noted, without deciding, two other pos-
sible bases for judicial review of civil nonenforcement 
decisions:  if (1) the decision was based “solely on belief 
that [the agency] lacked jurisdiction”; or (2) an agency 
expressly adopted a “general policy that is so extreme 
as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsi-
bilities.”  470 U.S. at 833 n.4.  The Supreme Court 
later rejected the first possibility in I.C.C. v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers, finding that an agency’s 
reliance on a “reviewable reason” for an otherwise unre-
viewable discretionary decision did not transform the 
decision into one subject to APA review.  482 U.S. 270, 
283 (1987).  The second, which might be thought re-
lated to the Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST. art II, § 3, 
remains a narrow exception theoretically permitting ju-
dicial review of agency enforcement decisions in some 
rare cases. 
B. The rescission of DACA is not reviewable.  
 The decision to rescind DACA is precisely the sort of 
enforcement decision that is “traditionally  . . .  ‘com-
mitted to agency discretion’  ” and not reviewable by the 
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courts.  Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.  None of the recog-
nized exceptions to that limitation apply, and so the re-
scission of DACA is not reviewable under the APA.  
 The Supreme Court has recognized that a “principal 
feature of the removal system is the broad discretion ex-
ercised by immigration officials.”  Arizona v. United 
States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012).  Indeed, executive de-
cisions about immigration enforcement are even further 
beyond the capacity of judicial review than criminal en-
forcement decisions, which are otherwise thought to 
represent the peak of executive discretion.  AAADC, 
525 U.S. at 489-90.  
 As a result, with or without DACA, government 
agents have discretion to grant deferred action in indi-
vidual cases.  Id. at 483-84, 484 n.8.  At least by its 
own terms, DACA did not eliminate the individualized 
discretion over enforcement decisions:  it created pro-
cedural and substantive scaffolding to guide that discre-
tion.  See Napolitano Memorandum at 2.  Rescinding 
DACA took away the scaffolding but left the underlying 
core—individualized discretion—untouched.  Thus, in-
sofar as DACA is merely a programmatic enforcement 
decision, so is its rescission, and both are unreviewable.  
 The best argument in favor of reviewability is that 
DACA itself was something other than an enforcement 
decision.  Once granted, deferred action makes recipi-
ents eligible for benefits such as the ability to work le-
gally in the country.  These are subsidiary or collateral 
benefits that arise from other legal provisions not chal-
lenged here.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (“  ‘[U]nauthor-
ized alien’ means  . . .  that the alien is not at that 
time  . . .  authorized to be so employed by this chap-
ter or by the Attorney General.”); see also 8 C.F.R.  
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§ 274a.12(c)(14).  Yet the Fifth Circuit found DAPA re-
viewable because it “would affirmatively confer ‘lawful 
presence’ and associated benefits.”  Texas, 809 F.3d at 
166.  Moreover, some have argued that DACA only 
masquerades as a program involving individualized dis-
cretion and in fact amounts to an entitlement of benefits 
for the class of aliens who meet the program’s threshold 
criteria.  Again, the Fifth Circuit reached a similar con-
clusion about DAPA.  See id. at 171-76.  
 But neither side presses such an argument in this 
case, and for good reason.  The government does not 
because it claims DACA’s rescission is unreviewable.  
Nor do the plaintiffs, because if they did, their case 
would be much harder on the merits.  DACA relied on 
identified individualized enforcement as a necessary 
predicate for the program’s existence.  See The De-
partment of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize 
Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the 
United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. 
O.L.C. ____, 2014 WL 10788677, at *13 n.8 (Nov. 19, 
2014).  If that predicate was false, then DACA was al-
most surely procedurally and substantively invalid.  
And that would mean one of the Department’s proffered 
explanations for rescinding DACA—that it was likely 
unlawful—was valid.  Unsurprisingly then, the plain-
tiffs do not rely on this point, giving us no occasion to 
consider whether DACA might be anything other than 
what it claimed to be:  a program for a specific exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion. 
 No other exception makes the plaintiffs’ APA claims 
reviewable.  In particular, nothing in the INA over-
comes Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability.  That 
presumption “may be rebutted where the substantive 
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statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow 
in exercising its enforcement powers.”  Chaney, 470 U.S. 
at 832-33; see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) 
(“§ 701(a)(2) requires careful examination of the statute 
on which the claim of agency illegality is based[.]”).  
Nothing in the INA cabins the government’s broad im-
migration enforcement discretion.  To the contrary, the 
INA expansively vests the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity with authority for “establishing national immigration 
enforcement policies and priorities.”  6 U.S.C. § 202(5); 
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).  Our nation’s immigra-
tion laws do not limit the Secretary’s authority to en-
force those laws by removing illegal aliens.  As a result, 
the INA does not overcome the presumptive unreview-
ability of the DACA rescission.  
C. The generalized nature of DACA does not render its 
rescission reviewable.  
 The Majority adopts a new exception, contending 
that general enforcement policies, unlike individual en-
forcement decisions, are reviewable.  While this excep-
tion has some support in out-of-circuit precedent, I 
would reject it.  
 This exception is grounded in dictum from Chaney, 
which left open the possibility of review when an agency 
adopts a “general policy that is so extreme as to amount 
to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities .”  
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (emphasis added).  That is, 
a general policy that licensed illegal conduct across the 
board or that categorically excluded a class of individu-
als from complying with the law might well be reviewa-
ble.  But nobody here is arguing that the rescission of 
DACA should be so characterized.  Nor could they.  A 
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return to the pre-DACA regime would increase the De-
partment’s enforcement of the immigration laws, not 
abandon it.  
 A few cases from the D.C. Circuit seem to stretch 
Chaney’s dictum to encompass any “general enforce-
ment policy,” as opposed to a “single-shot nonenforcement 
decision.”  E.g., OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States, 
132 F.3d 808, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Crowley Car-
ibbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 
1994)).  The facts of these cases suggest this principle 
may be narrower than it appears at first blush.  For ex-
ample, in some cases, the agency’s policy was promul-
gated as a binding regulation after notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, which would of course be much more ame-
nable to judicial review than a program like DACA, an-
nounced by an informal memorandum.  See National 
Wildlife Federation v. EPA, 980 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 
1992).  It also appears that these cases did not involve 
programs that, like DACA, were expressly predicated 
on the agency’s exercise of individualized discretion.  
 To the extent that the D.C. Circuit has embraced the 
broad principle that any “general enforcement policy” 
is judicially reviewable, that principle simply cannot be 
reconciled with Chaney.  There, the Supreme Court 
held unreviewable the FDA’s categorical decision not to 
take enforcement action against a class of actors (drug 
manufacturers, prison administrators, and others in the 
drug distribution chain).  470 U.S. at 824-25, 837-38.  
The fact that the decision was made by the FDA Com-
missioner made no difference.  See id. at 824.  The 
D.C. Circuit’s decisions in this area do not even attempt 
to explain how this sweeping principle can be reconciled 
with the facts of Chaney.  See, e.g., Crowley, 37 F.3d at 
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675-77.  Indeed, they often have no reasoning, simply 
reciting language (often dicta) from earlier circuit cases.  
 Such a broad exception for “generalized enforcement 
policies” would also unduly trammel the Executive 
Branch in carrying out its duties.  The head of an 
agency has every right to exercise enforcement discre-
tion.  Standardizing (i.e., generalizing) how agents use 
their prosecutorial discretion does not alter its charac-
ter.  Whether the Secretary exercises her discretion 
over an individual case or provides guidance for how dis-
cretion should be applied in a class of cases, the decision 
is unreviewable as one “committed to agency discretion 
by law.”  Under the plaintiffs’ view, a line agent’s deci-
sion not to remove a cancer-stricken alien would be un-
reviewable, but a front-office policy directing line agents 
to consider whether an alien is terminally ill would be 
reviewable.  That distinction is untenable.  See Per-
ales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that § 701(a)(2) precluded review of a categori-
cal refusal by a district office to grant work authoriza-
tion and pre-hearing voluntary departure to a certain 
class of eligible aliens over a three-year period).  
 As anyone who has exercised enforcement discretion 
knows, supervisory control over that discretion is neces-
sary to avoid arbitrariness and ensure consistency.  
Supervision through generalized guidance that directs 
the exercise of enforcement discretion cannot transform 
the enforcement directive into a reviewable action.  To 
find that discretionary enforcement decisions are unre-
viewable only when inferior officers exercise single-shot 
enforcement decisions also brushes aside the separation 
of powers that the Constitution lays out.  The Presi-
dent is empowered by Article II to “take Care that the 
52a 
Laws be faithfully executed,” and thus may hire officers 
to assist in these duties.  But the constitutional respon-
sibility remains firmly at the President’s feet, and there-
fore, the President remains responsible for his subordi-
nates’ exercise of executive power.  Free Enter. Fund 
v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 
(2010) (“The President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithful-
ness of the officers who execute them.”).4 
 DACA—at least on its face—was just such an unre-
viewable exercise of supervisory enforcement discre-
tion.  It was issued by the Secretary and instructed her 
subordinates when and how to exercise their discretion, 
emphasizing that “requests for relief pursuant to this 
memorandum are to be decided on a case by case basis.”  
                                                 
4  The supervisory use of prosecutorial discretion is not a novel 
phenomenon.  See, e.g., Treasury Department Circular to the Su-
pervisors of the Revenue (Sept. 30, 1791), in 9 PAPERS OF ALEXAN-
DER HAMILTON 248-49 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) (advising Treas-
ury officials that “a great relaxation appears unavoidable” in enforc-
ing provisions for seizing spirits without required certificates); Ruth 
Wedgewood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 
100 YALE L.J. 229, 278, 339-53 (1990) (describing President Adams’s 
decision to direct the federal prosecutor to enter a nolle prosequi for 
an allegedly mutinous sailor and describing then-Representative 
John Marshall’s floor speech defending the Executive’s prosecuto-
rial discretion, see 10 ANNALS OF CONG., 6th Cong. 1st Sess. 614-17 
(Mar. 7, 1800)); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CON-
GRESS, THE JEFFERSONIANS:  1801-1829, at 5-6 (2001) (noting Pres-
ident Jefferson’s “decision to pardon two individuals who had been 
convicted under the Sedition Act and to quash the pending prosecu-
tion of a third”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Duane 
(May 23, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 54, 55 
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) (explaining that whenever President 
Jefferson should be met with a prosecution under the Sedition law 
he would treat it as a nullity and order a nolle prosequi). 
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Napolitano Memorandum at 2.  Such general decisions 
on enforcement policy, no less than the individual deci-
sions that flow from them, cannot be reviewed by the 
courts without intruding on the prerogatives of the Ex-
ecutive Branch.  And that is necessarily true of DACA’s 
rescission, which merely removed one avenue for exer-
cising individualized discretion.  As a result, the rescis-
sion is an even less viable candidate for judicial review 
than is the promulgation of DACA.  
D. The Acting Secretary’s use of legal reasoning in  
rescinding DACA does not render her decision  
reviewable.  
 The plaintiffs also argue that the Acting Secretary’s 
use of legal reasoning in deciding to rescind DACA 
makes the decision subject to judicial review.  In their 
view, courts can evaluate legal determinations.  
 This argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court prec-
edent.  The Supreme Court has matter-of-factly ex-
plained that there is no “principle that if the agency gives 
a reviewable reason for otherwise unreviewable action, 
the action becomes reviewable.”  BLE, 482 U.S. at 283 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Enforcement deci-
sions are often intertwined with legal reasoning, most ob-
viously “the prosecutor’s belief (sometimes publicly 
stated) that the law will not sustain a conviction.”  Id.  
The Court found it “entirely clear” that this “reviewable” 
proposition cannot render the prosecutor’s “refusal to 
prosecute” subject to judicial review.  Id.  
 Efforts to distinguish BLE factually cannot avoid its 
holding.  In BLE, an agency had refused to reconsider 
a prior decision on the ground of material error.  The 
Court found that such denials of reconsideration have 
54a 
“traditionally been ‘committed to agency discretion by 
law.’ ”  Id. at 282 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832).  
As here, the plaintiffs argued that the particular deci-
sion before the Court should be reviewable anyway, be-
cause the agency had based its refusal on a reviewable 
issue of law.  The Court disagreed and held, as noted, 
that an unreviewable decision does not become reviewa-
ble by virtue of the reasons provided.  Id. at 280-81.  
That holding is plainly not limited to cases involving re-
quests for reconsideration.  After BLE, the scope of 
permissible judicial review must be determined by the 
type of agency action at issue and not the agency’s rea-
sons for acting.  
 Just as in BLE, there is a nonsensical implication in 
the plaintiffs’ position:  that the Executive’s discretion 
is more constrained when it gives a “reviewable” reason 
for its actions than when it gives no reason at all.  If the 
Acting Secretary was wrong about the likely illegality  
of DACA,5 then this might mean that she had provided 
no lawful reason for the rescission.  But in the context 
                                                 
5  Evaluating the actual legality of DACA requires considering 
whether and how a court may adjudicate an alleged violation of the 
Take Care Clause.  See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,  
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838).  But it also requires addressing 
the distinct question of whether and how one presidential admin-
istration may determine that a previous administration’s policy was 
inconsistent with the constitutional obligation to take care that the 
nation’s immigration laws be faithfully executed.   Cf. Letter from 
President George Washington to Sec’y Alexander Hamilton, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury (Sept. 7, 1792) in 32 WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 144 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (writing in 1792 
about enforcing unpopular tax laws, President Washington ex-
plained that it was his “duty to see the Laws executed:   to permit 
them to be trampled upon with impunity would be repugnant to it”).   
55a 
of the Executive’s enforcement discretion, this is per-
fectly appropriate.  The Executive need not explain why 
it makes particular enforcement and non-enforcement  
decisions.  The Judicial Branch cannot bootstrap re-
view of decisions committed to the discretion of the 
other branches simply because the reasons provided are 
of a type that judges consider themselves competent to 
evaluate. 
 In any event, the Acting Secretary’s rescission mem-
orandum was not a mere statement on the legality of 
DACA.  Instead, the memorandum considered various 
court rulings as well as the Attorney General’s letter be-
fore concluding that the “DACA program should be ter-
minated.”  Duke Memorandum at 4 (emphasis added).  
She did not say that DACA must be terminated or that she 
lacked the legal authority to enforce DACA or a DACA-
like program.  And in declaring the rescission of DACA 
after a six-month wind-down period, the Acting Secretary 
invoked her statutory authority to “establish[] national im-
migration policies and priorities.”  Id.  The Acting Sec-
retary’s legal analysis was only one aspect of her reason-
ing for rescinding DACA, and, of course, a prosecutor may 
consider beliefs about the law when setting enforcement 
policy, see BLE, 482 U.S. at 283.  
 For these reasons, I conclude that the plaintiffs’ APA 
claims are not reviewable and would dismiss them.  
III.  Constitutional Claims 
 Because they rule for the plaintiffs under the APA, 
my colleagues in the Majority decline to address the 
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.  But because I find the 
plaintiffs’ APA claims to be unreviewable, I must briefly 
address their claims that the rescission of DACA also 
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violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantees of Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection.6  I have little trouble con-
cluding that it did not. 
A. Due Process 
 The plaintiffs’ due process claim fails to articulate a 
constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property inter-
est impacted by the rescission of DACA.  And without 
a protected interest, there can be no unconstitutional 
deprivation.  
 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees that “[n]o person shall  . . .  be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.  A plaintiff raising a due 
process claim must thus begin by identifying a relevant 
liberty or property interest.  Wooten v. Clifton Forge 
Sch. Bd., 655 F.2d 552, 554 (4th Cir. 1981).  While a gov-
ernment benefit may create such an interest, “a person 
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire 
for [the benefit].  . . .  He must, instead, have a legit-
imate claim of entitlement to it.”  Bd. of Regents of 
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  
 While the plaintiffs argue that DACA created such a 
claim of entitlement, it did not.  On its face, DACA ex-
plicitly conferred no protected property or liberty inter-
est, making deferred action putatively available on a dis-
cretionary case-by-case basis for two-year periods that 
could be terminated at any time at the Secretary’s dis-
cretion.  See Napolitano Memorandum at 2-3; AAADC, 
                                                 
6 Of course, courts may review the exercise of enforcement discre-
tion for compliance with the Constitution.  See Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
at 464.   
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525 U.S. at 484-85.  The memorandum itself acknowl-
edged that such rights could be conferred only by “Con-
gress, acting through its legislative authority.”  Id. at 
3; see also Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 429 (4th Cir. 
2002) (noting that for a statute to create a liberty or 
property interest, “it must confer more than a mere ex-
pectation (even one supported by consistent govern-
ment practice) of a benefit”).  Having failed to show a 
protected interest, the plaintiffs’ due process claim fails.  
 The plaintiffs may have serious concerns about our 
nation’s immigration laws and the Department’s policy 
of enforcing those laws.  But an understandable policy 
concern is not a legally cognizable right.  The rescis-
sion of DACA simply does not generate a due process 
claim.  
B. Equal Protection  
 The plaintiffs also argue that the rescission of DACA 
violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal pro-
tection by targeting a class of aliens for removal based 
on their race and national origin.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).  They have failed to plausibly 
allege such a claim.  
 As both parties acknowledge, DACA is an enforce-
ment policy, and so the plaintiffs’ challenge to its rescis-
sion is necessarily a selective-prosecution claim.7  In an 
                                                 
7  The plaintiffs assert that they are not claiming selective prose-
cution “but instead that the Government violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by rescinding the DACA program in order to target a 
class defined by race and national origin.”  Appellants’ Response 
Brief at 30.  This attempted rewording makes no difference.  The 
rescission of DACA reset the agency’s enforcement policies to no 
longer channel the exercise of enforcement discretion in a certain 
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ordinary selective-prosecution case, the plaintiffs would 
have to show that the government’s conduct “had a dis-
criminatory effect and that it was motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose.”  Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598, 608 (1985); see also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (not-
ing that “the decision whether to prosecute may not be 
based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, reli-
gion, or other arbitrary classification’ ”) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).  There 
is also a “presumption that a prosecutor has acted law-
fully,” which can be displaced only by “clear evidence.”  
AAADC, 525 U.S. at 489.  But the plaintiffs’ burden is 
even higher in this case, because the rescission of DACA 
only applies to aliens who are in this country illegally.  
Such an alien “has no constitutional right to assert se-
lective enforcement as a defense against his deporta-
tion,” with a possible exception for “rare” cases of par-
ticularly “outrageous” discrimination.  Id. at 488, 491. 
 Here, both DACA and its rescission are, on their face, 
neutral policies.  Logically, the presumption of lawful-
ness that applies in individual selective-prosecution cases 
is at least as strong when applied to neutral policies 
promulgated by senior Executive Branch officials.  And 
the plaintiffs must allege facts that, if true, plausibly 
suggest that this presumption can be overcome and re-
placed with an inference of outrageous discrimination.  
 The plaintiffs have alleged two sets of facts to sup-
port their claim of discrimination.  First, they argue 
                                                 
way.  As the plaintiffs cannot dispute that the government has the 
statutory authority to enforce the immigration laws against them, 
any equal protection claim in this context must necessarily be a 
selective-prosecution claim.   
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that since 93% of DACA recipients are Latino, the pro-
gram’s rescission had a disparate impact.  A selective-
prosecution claim normally requires differential treat-
ment of “similarly situated individuals of a different 
race.”  Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.  Yet who is “simi-
larly situated” to DACA recipients except other DACA 
recipients?  Setting aside the closely related and now-
rescinded DAPA program, DACA stands alone as a 
unique exercise of Executive authority.  While there 
are other deferred action programs (many of which are 
statutory), none resembles DACA.  And the Department 
rescinded DACA for all recipients, not just for those of 
a particular ethnicity or nationality.  
 Second, the plaintiffs rely on presidential campaign 
tweets, which they claim show invidious animus.  But 
the plaintiffs must create a plausible inference that the 
same animus allegedly underlying these statements also 
motivated the Attorney General and the Acting Secre-
tary to take the official government actions at issue.  
Their complaint simply lacks the connective tissue re-
quired to draw that inference.  There is also an “obvi-
ous alternative explanation” for these officials’ actions. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009).  As the rec-
ord shows, DACA has long been politically controver-
sial.  It “should come as no surprise,” id., that well-
known policy differences would lead cabinet officials in 
a new administration to change a controversial govern-
ment policy.  See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec-
retary, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., “Enforcement of the 
Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest” 2 
(Feb. 20, 2017) (setting out the Administration’s new en-
forcement policies and stating “the Department no 
longer will exempt classes or categories of removable al-
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iens from potential enforcement”).  Changes in govern-
ment policy are perfectly lawful, and for a selective-
prosecution claim, we must presume that the Attorney 
General and the Acting Secretary were motivated by 
such a lawful purpose.  AAADC, 525 U.S. at 489.  The 
plaintiffs allege no facts plausibly displacing that pre-
sumption. 
 In short, the plaintiffs have presented no evidence 
that racial motivations played any part in either the for-
mer Attorney General’s advice or the former Acting 
Secretary’s decision to rescind DACA.  Therefore, I 
would dismiss the equal protection claim.  
IV.  Information-Sharing Policy 
 The Majority is correct that the plaintiffs’ estoppel 
claim against the Department is baseless.  The availa-
bility of equitable estoppel against the government is 
controversial under any circumstances.  See Office of 
Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419-21 (1990).  
The issue remains unresolved by the Supreme Court. 
See id. at 423.  And we have recognized that if such  
a doctrine is ever justified in this context, there must  
be “affirmative misconduct by government agents.”  
Dawkins v. Witt, 318 F.3d 606, 611 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing 
INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973)).  
 In any case, the mere fact that the Department ex-
plicitly told applicants that its information-sharing pol-
icy “may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any 
time” and that the policy “may not be relied upon to cre-
ate any right or benefit,” J.A. 1004, is enough to end our 
analysis.  There was nothing for the plaintiffs to rely 
on for the proposition that their information was im-
mune from disclosure.  
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 Additionally, even if the doctrine of estoppel applied 
here, that would not justify the district court’s nation-
wide injunction.  See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 
1930-31, 1934 (2018); Virginia Society for Human Life, 
Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 394 (4th Cir. 2001) (abrogated 
on other grounds).  This potent judicial tool was largely 
unheard-of until the mid-twentieth century.  Samuel L. 
Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National 
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 428 (2017).  These 
broad injunctions pose many drawbacks that can quickly 
outweigh their benefits, particularly when they are over-
used (and overused repeatedly).  Among other things, 
such injunctions sharpen plaintiffs’ incentives to forum-
shop while inhibiting the proper ventilation of difficult 
legal issues by deterring other lower courts from grap-
pling with them.  See id. at 460-61.  Under our decen-
tralized and multifaceted judicial system, judges must 
scrutinize the scope of the injunctive remedies they 
fashion.  Even assuming a nationwide injunction could 
be appropriate in some case, an injunction that is limited 
to the plaintiffs should generally suffice.  
*  *  * 
 We in the Judicial Branch have a narrowly circum-
scribed role.  It is not our place to second-guess the 
wisdom of the discretionary decisions made by the other 
Branches.  The rescission of DACA was a controversial 
and contentious decision, but one that was committed to 
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On October 5, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seek-
ing to enjoin rescission of a program known as Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), asserting a va-
riety of claims as to why the rescission was unlawful.  
See ECF No. 1.  Plaintiffs are a number of individual 
participants in that program known as “Dreamers,” as 
well as a series of special interest organizations that deal 
with immigration policy issues and work directly with 
immigrants in the community.  Id. at 11-21.  Defend-
ants are President Donald Trump, Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions, and a series of government agencies—the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), U.S. Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), U.S. Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”)—as well as 
each agency’s acting leader (secretary, director, or com-
missioner).  Defendants collectively will be referred to 
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as the “Government.”  Each individual defendant is be-
ing sued in his or her official capacity.  Id. at 21-22. 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges a number of causes of 
action—both administrative and constitutional—which 
they believe are proper grounds for relief.  Plaintiffs 
assert that rescission of the DACA program was unlaw-
ful under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 
both (1) as an arbitrary and capricious decision and  
(2) for failure to follow notice-and-comment procedures.  
Id. at 54-58.  Plaintiffs further allege that the DACA 
rescission was a violation of the Fifth Amendment on the 
grounds of procedural due process, substantive due pro-
cess, and equal protection.  Id. at 49-54.  Plaintiffs 
seek injunctive relief on the basis of equitable estoppel 
both as to the DACA rescission itself and its information 
sharing policy.  Id. at 58-59.  Lastly, Plaintiffs seek 
declaratory relief that the DACA program is lawful.  
Id. at 59-60. 
On November 1, 2017, the Court held an in-person 
status conference in order to resolve the scheduling and 
logistical issues of this case.  ECF No. 19.  Thereafter 
on November 15, 2017, the Government filed a Motion to 
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.  
ECF No. 27.  On November 28, 2017, Plaintiffs respon-
ded in opposition, ECF No. 29, and on December 5, 2017, 
the Government replied in support of its Motion, ECF 
No. 30.  The Court issued an Order on December 11, 
2017 giving notice to the parties in accordance with Rule 
56(f ) that it may grant summary judgment for the non-
moving party.  See ECF No. 31.  On December 15, 2017, 




“Can we all get along?”—Rodney King1 
In recent years, many Americans have found them-
selves sharing Mr. King’s sentiment.  This Court pre-
viously noted, albeit in the context of congressional ger-
rymandering, that “[n]ever before has the United States 
seen such deep political divisions as exist today, and 
while the courts are struggling in their efforts to find a 
standard [for the adjudication of gerrymandering claims], 
the fires of excessive partisanship are burning and our 
national government is encountering deadlock as never 
before.”  Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 905 
(D. Md. 2011) (Titus, J., concurring), aff ’d, 567 U.S. 930 
(2012).  Unfortunately, that 2011 observation still holds 
true today—perhaps even more so. 
This case is yet another example of the damaging fall-
out that results from excessive political partisanship.  
The highly politicized debate surrounding the DACA 
program has thus far produced only rancor and accusa-
tions.  During the recent debate over the rescission of 
DACA, the program even turned into a bargaining chip 
that resulted in a brief shutdown of the entire federal 
government earlier this year.2  In order to adequately re-
solve the legal issues of this case, it is important to step 
back from the heated rhetoric and understand the context 
under which DACA was promulgated and rescinded. 
                                                 
1  See Richard A. Serrano, Rodney King: ‘Truth will come out’, 
L.A. Times (May 2, 1992), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/ 
la-me-king-case-aftermath-city-in-crisis-19920502-story.html. 
2  See Gregory Krieg, The DACA shutdown is over.  Now What?, 
CNN (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/22/politics/ 
shutdown-immigration-daca-outcomes/index.html. 
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The Dream Act—a Lengthy History of Failed Legislation 
The Constitution reserves the power to enact immi-
gration policy to the legislative branch.  U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 8 (“[T]o establish a uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion”).  However, the “supervision of the admission of 
aliens into the United States may be intrusted by [C]on-
gress” to the executive branch.  Nishimura Ekiu v. 
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).  For over a dec-
ade at the start of the 21st century, Congress quarreled 
over policies regarding illegal aliens who entered the coun-
try as children, and who may have no memory or connec-
tion with their country of origin.  Would the world’s bea-
con of freedom—a nation founded by immigrants—cast 
out an immigrant population that was likely brought here 
without choice and who likely now knows no other home?  
While “no” would seem to be the obvious answer, ordi-
nary logic has eluded our Congress. 
“Dreamers” are neither constitutionally nor statuto-
rily defined.  Rather, the concept of protection for 
“Dreamers” arises from repeated congressional failures 
to act, and presidential action taken in their wake.  A 
series of congressional sessions marked by bitter strife 
and inaction left the country without any protections for 
persons brought here illegally as children.  The first 
attempt at a Development, Relief, and Education for Al-
ien Minors (“DREAM”) Act came in 2001, and although 
it took on many names in subsequent years, the re-
peated attempts to pass this legislation were filibus-
tered, abandoned, or defeated on the floor.3  As illus-
trated by the frequency of bills proposed, Dreamer  
                                                 
3  See Immigrant Children’s Educational Advancement and Drop-
out Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 1582, 107th Cong. (2001); Student 
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legislation reached its zenith during late 2010 in the 
111th Session of Congress.  On December 8, 2010, the 
House of Representatives actually passed the DREAM 
Act.4  However, like all other iterations of this contro-
versial legislation, its fate was doomed—this time, less 
than two weeks later on the Senate floor.5 
DACA—an Act of Desperation Born of Frustration with a 
Paralyzed Congress 
President Obama’s administration, faced with the re-
ality that Congress could do little more than squabble 
regarding the Dreamers, decided to take action on its 
own.  On June 15, 2012, then-Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Janet Napolitano, issued a memorandum prom-
ulgating by executive action what is now known as 
                                                 
Adjustment Act of 2001, H.R. 1918, 107th Cong. (2001); DREAM 
Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2002); DREAM Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong. 
(2003); DREAM Act of 2005, S. 2075, 109th Cong. (2005); Compre-
hensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006); 
American Dream Act, H.R. 5131, 109th Cong. (2006); DREAM Act, 
S. 2205, 110th Cong. (2007); Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007); DREAM Act of 2009, S. 729, 
111th Cong. (2009); DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3827, 111th Cong. (2010); 
DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010); DREAM Act of 
2010, S. 3963, 111th Cong. (2010); DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 
111th Cong. (2010); DREAM Act of 2010, H.R. 6497, 111th Cong. 
(2010); DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011). 
4  See John Brandt, House Passes DREAM Act Immigration 
Measures, Fox News (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/ 
2010/12/08/house-passes-dream-act-immigration-measures.html. 
5  See DREAM Act Goes Down in Flames in Senate, Fox News 
(Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/12/18/senate-
tries-pass-dream-act.html. 
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DACA (“DACA Memo”).6  DACA protections were af-
forded to the same class of immigrants foreseen by the 
various failed iterations of Dreamer legislation.  The 
primary qualifications for DACA protections were that 
an individual must (1) have come to the U.S. before the 
age of sixteen, (2) meet various education or military 
service requirements, (3) not have a criminal record, and 
(4) register prior to the age of thirty.7 
DACA was issued under a theory of “prosecutorial 
discretion” and “deferred action” and essentially per-
mitted otherwise illegal aliens to remain in the United 
States without fear of deportation.8  While some her-
alded DACA as a victory, others decried it as executive 
overreach—usurping the powers of Congress to prom-
ulgate immigration policy.9  Over the course of the next 
five years, approximately 800,000 Dreamers registered 
for DACA protections. 
Phase II:  DAPA 
Soon thereafter, the executive branch sought to ex-
pand its use of deferred action beyond the Dreamers.  
On November 20, 2014, then-Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity, Jeh Charles Johnson, issued a pair of memo-
randa in an attempt to promulgate what is now known 
                                                 
6  Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to 
the United States as Children (June 15, 2012). 
7  See id. 
8  See id. 
9  See Obama suspends deportation for thousands of illegals, tells 




as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”), 
as well as a series of minor expansions for DACA.10 
Less than a month later, DAPA was met with a legal 
challenge when Texas and twenty-five other states sued 
to enjoin implementation of the program.  See gener-
ally Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 
2015).  In that case, DAPA was struck down by the dis-
trict court, see id., and a divided Fifth Circuit panel af-
firmed the decision, see 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).  In 
June 2016, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision.  See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 
2271, 2272 (2016).  In addition to finding DAPA and the 
expansions of DACA unlawful, the judicial decisions 
throughout the DAPA litigation illustrate two key reali-
ties:  (1) challenges to DAPA or analogous immigration 
programs promulgated by DHS without approval by 
Congress are justiciable; and (2) reasonable legal minds 
may differ regarding their lawfulness. 
Aside from the classes of immigrants to which each 
applies, DACA and DAPA are largely similar programs 
addressing different classes or subcategories of immi-
grants.  While DACA affects a population of approxi-
mately 800,000 otherwise illegal aliens, DAPA would 
have affected nearly half of the 11,000,000 immigrants 
currently in the United States unlawfully.  See Texas v. 
United States, 787 F.3d 733, 745 (5th Cir. 2015).  DAPA 
                                                 
10 Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policies for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immi-
grants (Nov. 20, 2014); Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individu-
als Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to 
Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Perma-
nent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014). 
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was challenged and defeated before the program was 
ever successfully promulgated, while DACA has run for 
approximately half of a decade before the threat of any 
litigation. 
A Change in Administration and a Corresponding Change 
in Immigration Philosophy 
The 2016 presidential election brought a change in 
leadership of the executive branch and, with it, significant 
changes in immigration views and philosophies. 11  In 
June of 2017, and with the defeat of DAPA directly in 
the rear-view mirror, Texas and other state plaintiffs 
sent a letter threatening to challenge DACA if it were 
not rescinded by September 6, 2017.12  Attorney Gen-
eral Jeff Sessions advised the Acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security, Elaine Duke, that DACA was likely 
unlawful and headed for another legal battle.13  On Sep-
tember 5, 2017, Acting Secretary Duke issued a memo-
randum (“DACA Rescission Memo”) outlining a six-
month wind down of DACA to expire March 5, 2018.14 
According to the Administrative Record, the basis for 
the decision to rescind DACA was its presumed unlaw-
fulness in the wake of the DAPA litigation and the threat 
of imminent legal challenge.  The agency’s reasoning is 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Tessa Berenson, Middle Schoolers in Michigan Chant 
‘Build That Wall’ After Trump Victory, TIME (Nov. 11, 2016), 
http://time.com/4567812/donald-trump-middle-school-build-wall/. 
12 See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 238-40. 
13 See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 251. 
14 Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rescission of 
the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 
States as Children” (Sept. 5, 2017). 
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substantiated by the legal advice of the Attorney Gen-
eral and the fact that the memorandum was issued the 
day before the state parties had threatened to act.  A 
six-month wind down period was provided to avoid the 
potential for chaos if a court decision resulted in imme-
diate termination, and the President urged Congress to 
pass Dreamer-protection legislation.15 
Complicating the picture for some observers is the 
unfortunate and often inflammatory rhetoric used by 
President Trump during the campaign, as well as his 
Twitter pronouncements, both before and after his elec-
tion.  Thoughtful and careful judicial review is not 
aided when the President lobs verbal hand grenades at 
the federal courts, the Department of Justice, and any-
one else with whom he disagrees. 
As disheartening or inappropriate as the President’s 
occasionally disparaging remarks may be, they are not 
relevant to the larger issues governing the DACA re-
scission.  The DACA Rescission Memo is clear as to its 
purpose and reasoning, and its decision is rationally sup-
ported by the Administrative Record.  See generally 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (“[W]hen 
the Executive exercises [a congressionally delegated 
power of immigration policies and rules for the exclusion 
of aliens] negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason, the courts will [not] look behind 
the exercise of that discretion.”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557, 623-24 n.52 (2006) (“We have not heretofore, 
                                                 
15 See Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves  




in evaluating the legality of executive action, deferred to 
comments made by such officials to the media.”).16 
The executive branch may have the authority to ex-
ercise or not exercise prosecutorial discretion as it sees 
fit, and an agency certainly may refrain from action it 
reasonably believes to be unlawful.  Under the Consti-
tution, it is the responsibility of Congress to determine 
immigration policy, and the executive branch must only 
act within its constitutional and delegated legislative au-
thority.  Although Congress has repeatedly failed to 
pass Dreamer legislation in the past, the ball is again in 
its court.  And with 87 percent of Americans favoring 
some sort of DACA-esque protections, the elected mem-
bers of Congress should understandably feel the pres-
sure now that the President has deferred to them—in 
short, Congress needs to get the job done now that their 
                                                 
16 See also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 
2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting): 
Even if a politician’s past statements were utterly clear and con-
sistent, using them to yield a specific constitutional violation 
would suggest an absurd result—namely, that the policies of an 
elected official can be forever held hostage by the unguarded 
declarations of a candidate.  If a court were to find that cam-
paign skeletons prevented an official from pursuing otherwise 
constitutional policies, what could he do to cure the defect?  
Could he stand up and recant it all (“just kidding!”) and try 
again?  Or would we also need a court to police the sincerity of 
that mea culpa—piercing into the public official’s “heart of 
hearts” to divine whether he really changed his mind, just as the 
Supreme Court has warned us not to?  See McCreary, 545 U.S. 
at 862, 125 S. Ct. 2722. 
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authority has been recognized by court decisions and 
the President.17 
Other DACA Litigation 
Various plaintiffs have filed lawsuits seeking to enjoin 
the DACA rescission throughout the country—specifically 
in this Court, the Eastern District of New York, the 
Northern District of California, and the District of the 
District of Columbia.  These cases are at various 
stages, but preliminary injunctions have already been 
granted by the Eastern District of New York and the 
Northern District of California.18  With regard to the 
California case, the Government attempted to bypass 
the Ninth Circuit and directly petitioned the Supreme 
Court for a writ of certiorari before judgment. 19  On 
February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the peti-
tion without prejudice, and noted that “[i]t is assumed 
that the Court of Appeals [for the Ninth Circuit] will 
proceed expeditiously to decide this case.”20    
                                                 
17 See Jennifer De Pinto, Fred Backus, Kabir Khanna & Anthony 
Salvanto, Most Americans support DACA, but oppose border wall, 
CBS News (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-
americans-support-daca-but-oppose-border-wall-cbs-news-poll/. 
18 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 
No. CV 17-05211 WHA, 2018 WL 339144 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018); 
Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, No. CV 16-4756 NGG JO, 2018 WL 834074 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2018).    
19 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,  
No. CV 17-05211 WHA, 2018 WL 339144 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018), 
petition for cert. before judgment filed, 2018 WL 509822 (U.S. Jan 
18, 2018) (No. 17-1003).    
20 Docket, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal., No. 17-1003, (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018). 
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All courts reviewing the DACA rescission would ben-
efit from a prior generation’s wisdom regarding the sep-
aration of powers:  “A sturdy judiciary should not be 
swayed by the unpleasantness or unpopularity of neces-
sary executive action, but must independently deter-
mine for itself whether the President was acting, as re-
quired by the Constitution, to ‘take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.’  ”  Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 709 (1952).21    
The decisions to date by courts in California and New 
York are premised on the legal conclusion that DACA is 
lawful, and therefore, a decision to rescind DACA on the 
basis of unlawfulness is necessarily arbitrary and capri-
cious.  Respectfully, this Court disagrees.  Regard-
less of the lawfulness of DACA, the appropriate inquiry 
is whether or not DHS made a reasoned decision to re-
scind DACA based on the Administrative Record.  Any 
alternative inquiry would impermissibly require a court 
to “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”  See 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  Given the fate of 
                                                 
21  Or, more directly, as Judge Niemeyer notes in his recent dissent 
in the “travel ban” case.   
The public debate over the Administration’s foreign policy and, 
in particular, its immigration policy, is indeed intense and 
thereby seductively tempts courts to effect a politically preferred 
result when confronted with such issues.  But public respect for 
Article III courts calls for heightened discipline and sharpened 
focus on only the applicable legal principles to avoid substituting 
judicial judgment for that of elected representatives.    
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-2231, 2018 WL 
894413, at *104 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).  
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DAPA, the legal advice provided by the Attorney Gen-
eral, and the threat of imminent litigation, it was reason-
able for DHS to have concluded—right or wrong—that 
DACA was unlawful and should be wound down in an 
orderly manner.  Therefore, its decision to rescind 
DACA cannot be arbitrary and capricious.    
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Motion to Dismiss.  The purpose of a motion to dis-
miss under Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of a 
complaint.”  Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 
231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).  The Supreme Court has fur-
ther articulated the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket as-
sertion, of entitlement to relief.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
556 n.3.  To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must put forth “plausible claim[s] for relief.”  Francis 
v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).  “But 
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to 
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.’  ”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).    
Motion for Summary Judgment.  Summary judg-
ment is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(a) if there 
is no genuine dispute over any material facts, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fran-
cis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302 
(4th Cir. 2006).  A material fact is one that “might af-
fect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A 
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dispute of material fact is genuine if the evidence would 
allow the trier of fact to return a verdict for the nonmov-
ing party.  Id.  When considering a summary judgment 
motion, the court has “an affirmative obligation  . . .  
to prevent ‘factually unsupported claims or defenses’ 
from proceeding to trial.”  Felty v. Grave-Humphreys 
Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex, 
477 U.S. at 323-24).  Thus, the court may only rely on 
facts supported in the record, not assertions made in the 
pleading.  Id.  Moreover, the court must view all facts 
and make all reasonable inferences in the light most fa-
vorable to the nonmoving party.  Matsuhita Elec. In-
dus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  
The nonmoving party must present more than a “mere 
scintilla” of evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of 
material fact that would preclude summary judgment.  
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.    
III. ANALYSIS  
a. Justiciability  
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 
They possess only that power authorized by Constitu-
tion and statute.”  See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 
Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).  Congress has 
the authority to expand or limit federal district court ju-
risdiction by statute.  However, federal courts possess 
an inherent jurisdiction (under Article III and the fun-
damental principles of due process) over certain cases 
relating to the enforcement of the Constitution that can-
not be limited by Congress.  See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (permitting federal district 
court jurisdiction when necessary “to avoid the serious 
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constitutional question that would arise if a federal stat-
ute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a col-
orable constitutional claim.”).    
The Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal 
courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.”  U.S. Const. 
art. III, § 2.  However, federal courts may only review 
“cases and controversies” if they are justiciable.  See 
generally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-99 (1968) (dis-
cussing the doctrine of justiciability as “a blend of con-
stitutional requirements and policy considerations”).  
A case may lack justiciability when it involves a political 
question and implicates concerns regarding the separa-
tion of powers between the judiciary and one of the other 
branches of government.  See, e.g., Baker v. Carr,  
369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (“Deciding whether a matter 
has in any measure been committed by the Constitution 
to another branch of government, or whether the action 
of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been 
committed  . . .  is a responsibility of this Court as ul-
timate interpreter of the Constitution.”).  While execu-
tive actions may often involve otherwise unreviewable 
political questions, federal courts always retain the power 
to review matters of constitutional violations.  See id.  
Accordingly, the Court need not reach back to Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), to support the conclusion 
that Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are justiciable.    
Turning to Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, the Court is 
required to determine if judicial review has been limited 
by Congress under the APA.  The plain language of the 
APA—specifically, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702—indicates a pre-
sumption for judicial review, at least to the procedures 
surrounding agency decision-making (but not necessarily 
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to the substance of those decisions).  See generally Ab-
bott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (restating 
“the basic presumption of judicial review” for APA claims 
“so long as no statute precludes such relief or the action 
is not one committed by law to agency discretion”).22  Un-
der 5 U.S.C. § 701(a), the only two exceptions are when:  
“(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency ac-
tion is committed to agency discretion by law.” 
The Government argues both exceptions—that  
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) precludes judicial review, and that the 
DACA rescission is “committed to agency discretion” 
because it is a matter of prosecutorial discretion, see 
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996), 
immigration enforcement, see Arizona v. United States, 
567 U.S. 387, 396-97 (2012), and deferred action gener-
ally, see Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. 
(AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 485 (1999).  See ECF No. 27-1 
at 29-30.    
However, the notion that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) pre-
cludes judicial review has been rejected repeatedly.  
See, e.g., AADC, 525 U.S. at 482 (explicitly rejecting that 
§ 1252(g) serves as a zipper clause that functions to pro-
hibit all judicial review).  Furthermore, while DHS pos-
sesses specified delegated authority over immigration 
enforcement, Congress never explicitly granted DHS a 
blanket authority to disparately enforce policies.  
                                                 
22 abrogated on other grounds by statute, Pub. L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 
2721, as recognized in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977) 
(finding the statutory amendment to “eliminate the requirement of 
a specified amount in controversy as a prerequisite to the mainte-
nance of any (§ 1331) action brought against the United States, any 
agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official  
capacity”).    
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Plaintiffs’ APA claims are justiciable because they 
relate to the procedures followed by DHS—not to the 
substance of its policy or its decision of a specific case.  
The Court may review whether the repeal of DACA fol-
lowed the correct APA procedures.  Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the Government’s explanation for 
rescinding DACA was the Secretary’s belief that the 
program was unlawful and would face lengthy legal chal-
lenges.  The similarities between DACA and DAPA sup-
port justiciability in this case because review of DAPA 
was also found to be justiciable.  See Texas v. United 
States, 809 F.3d 134, 155-64 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Congress 
has expressly limited or precluded judicial review of 
many immigration decisions  . . .  but DAPA is not 
one of them.”), aff ’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).23  
                                                 
23 See also Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 165-170 (5th Cir. 
2015), aff ’d, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016).    
Congress did not intend to make immune from judicial review an 
agency action that reclassifies millions of illegal aliens in a way 
that imposes substantial costs on states that have relied on  
the protections conferred by § 1621.  . . .  Chaney’s presump-
tion against judicial review of agency inaction [exists] because 
there are no meaningful standards against which to judge the 
agency’s exercise of discretion.  But where there is affirmative 
agency action—as with DAPA’s issuance of lawful presence and 
employment authorization—and in light of the INA’s intricate 
regulatory scheme for changing immigration classifications and 
issuing employment authorization, the action at least can be re-
viewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its statutory 
powers.  . . .   
At its core, this case is about the Secretary’s decision to change 
the immigration classification of millions of illegal aliens on a 
class-wide basis.  The states properly maintain that DAPA’s 
grant of lawful presence and accompanying eligibility for bene-
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Accordingly, the Court finds all claims in Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint are justiciable. 
b. Standing  
Direct standing exists for plaintiffs who have an  
injury-in-fact that is traceable to the defendants and 
which is redressable through adjudication.  See Lujan 
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992).  The in-
jury must be more than a generalized grievance, which 
is an ideological objection or an injury widely shared by 
all members of the public.  See id. at 575.  Organiza-
tions have direct standing when government action has 
impaired the organization’s own legal rights.  See, e.g., 
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 
333, 342 (U.S. 1977).  However, association standing 
also exists for organizational plaintiffs when (1) its mem-
bers would otherwise have standing to sue in their own 
right, (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane 
to the purpose of the organization, and (3) neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the par-
ticipation of individual members in the lawsuit.  See id. 
at 343.    
The Government does not contest the standing of the 
individual plaintiffs.  However, it argues that the or-
ganizational plaintiffs lack direct standing because they 
are not “the object of any government policy” and are 
                                                 
fits is a substantive rule that must go through notice and com-
ment, before it imposes substantial costs on them, and that 
DAPA is substantively contrary to law.  The federal courts are 
fully capable of adjudicating those disputes.  Because the inter-
ests that Texas seeks to protect are within the INA’s zone of in-
terests, and judicial review is available, we address whether 
Texas has established a substantial likelihood of success on its 
claim that DAPA must be submitted for notice and comment.   
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merely seeking to “vindicate their own value prefer-
ences.”  See ECF No. 27-1 at 38-39 (equating the or-
ganizational plaintiffs’ injury to a mere “generalized 
grievance”).  The Government also argues that the or-
ganizational plaintiffs lack representational standing for 
failing to identify members of their organizations who 
are directly harmed by the repeal of DACA, see id. at 
41-42, or reside within DACA’s zone-of-interests, see id. 
at 42 (citing Clarke v. Secs. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 
395-96 (1987)).    
The Government’s challenges to the standing of the 
organizational plaintiffs miss the mark.  Casa De Mar-
yland and the rest of the organizational plaintiffs are 
special interest groups directly focused on aiding immi-
grants and their communities.  The fact that one of 
their primary functions has been assisting their mem-
bers with “tens of thousands of DACA initial and re-
newal applications” is sufficient for standing in and of 
itself.  See ECF No. 29 at 33.  In addition to direct 
standing, the organizational plaintiffs possess associa-
tion standing.  Each organization has identified a num-
ber of its members who are Dreamers, and who unques-
tionably would have standing in this case.  Further-
more, the purpose of these organizations is to aid and 
represent immigrants in their communities, including 
compliance with immigration procedures. Therefore, 
the rescission of DACA has an absolute nexus to the or-
ganizations’ purpose.  Additionally, the relief sought is 
injunctive and declaratory relief—not damages or any 
other remedy requiring the individual Dreamers.  
Hence, these organizational plaintiffs are the prototypi-
cal examples of possessing association standing.    
81a 
Accordingly, the Court finds all Plaintiffs have stand-
ing in the instant case.    
c. APA Claims  
Rulemaking is a common method federal agencies 
use to promulgate decisions.  See generally Bi-Metallic 
Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 
(1915); Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 
385 (1908).  Informal rulemaking is standardized under 
the APA and requires notice-and-comment procedures.  
See 5 U.S.C. § 553; e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia 
Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977).  In-
formal rulemaking does not include non-legislative rule-
making, such as procedural rules, interpretive rules, or 
policy statements.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b); e.g., McLouth 
Steel Prod. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1324-25 
(D.C. Cir. 1988).    
After the notice-and-comment requirements, if ap-
plicable, have been met, courts must take a hard look at 
whether the decision to promulgate or repeal a rule is 
“arbitrary or capricious”—which is to say that there 
must be a rational correlation between the facts reviewed 
and the decision made.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 
of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
42-44 (1983) (explaining that an agency must examine 
relevant data, articulate a satisfactory explanation con-
temporaneously with its decision, using rationale that 
comes from the agency (and not from a court inferring 
after the fact logic that is not explicitly stated in the  
record)).  See id.  However, even when notice-and-
comment requirements do not apply, agency decisions 
are subject to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706.  By 
statute, “[t]he reviewing court shall  . . .  hold unlaw-
ful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
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found to be  . . .  arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  
5 U.S.C. § 706(2).    
The DACA program is a deferral of action, which by 
definition is an exercise of discretion rather than a rule 
with the force of law.  Furthermore, the DACA Rescis-
sion Memo was not immediately binding, but rather a 
statement of intended policy beginning March 5, 2018.  
To the extent that Plaintiffs aver that, in practice, immi-
gration reviews absent DACA protections lack individu-
alized discretion, their dispute is merely with how the 
agency applies its policy, and not with the policy itself.24  
Although a substantial paradigm shift, the DACA Re-
scission Memo neither curtails DHS’s discretion regard-
ing individual immigration reviews, nor does it prevent 
the agency from granting Dreamers deferred action sta-
tus again in the future.  Hence, DACA and its rescis-
sion are more akin to non-binding policy statements, and 
thus not subject to notice-and-comment requirements.    
Plaintiffs argue that the decision to rescind DACA 
must be arbitrary and capricious because the Adminis-
trative Record is “insufficient” to make a decision of such 
magnitude.  See ECF No. 29 at 35-39 (noting that the 
Administrative Record is only 256 pages long—192 of 
which are court opinions related to DAPA); see also In 
re United States, No. 17-72917, 2017 WL 5505730, at *2 
(9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2017) (“The notion that the head of a 
                                                 
24  Plaintiffs’ APA claim regarding DACA’s information sharing 
policy also lacks merit.  Nothing in the DACA Rescission Memo 
outlines any change—let alone implements a substantive rule—with 
regard to the use of any individual’s information gathered during 
DACA’s implementation.    
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United States agency would decide to terminate a pro-
gram giving legal protection to roughly 800,000 people 
based on 256 pages of publicly available documents is 
not credible.”).    
However, based on the historical and political con-
text outlined in the introductory pages of this Opinion, 
the decision to rescind DACA was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious, but rather was a carefully crafted decision 
supported by the Administrative Record.  It is well es-
tablished that “[t]he scope of review under the ‘arbi-
trary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is 
not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”  
State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  Therefore, it is ir-
relevant whether this Court, a judge in California or 
New York, or even a justice on the Supreme Court might 
have made a different decision while standing in the 
shoes of DHS on September 5, 2017.  Rather, the rele-
vant inquiry is whether the decision was made with a 
“satisfactory explanation for its action including a ra-
tional connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).    
DHS’s rationale provided in the DACA Rescission 
Memo was a belief, based on recent court decisions and 
the advice of the Attorney General, that DACA was unlaw-
ful.  Assuming that a reasonable basis for that belief 
exists in the Administrative Record, how could trying to 
avoid unlawful action possibly be arbitrary and capri-
cious?  Quite simply, it cannot.  Regardless of whether 
DACA is, in fact, lawful or unlawful, the belief that it was 
unlawful and subject to serious legal challenge is com-
pletely rational.    
DAPA—an analogous program, promulgated by anal-
ogous means—had been defeated less than a year prior.  
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The litigation that stopped DAPA included expansions 
of DACA itself.  The same plaintiffs who defeated DAPA 
threatened to challenge DACA imminently.  The At-
torney General of the United States—the nation’s chief 
legal officer—provided legal advice that DACA was like-
wise unlawful and likely ill-fated against a legal challenge.  
All of this is in the Administrative Record—the remnants 
of the DAPA litigation,25 the threatened legal challenge,26 
and the Attorney General’s advisory letter.27    
Therefore, what did the Acting Secretary of DHS 
do?  She opted for a six-month wind-down period in-
stead of the chaotic possibility of an immediate termina-
tion, which would come at a time known only to the judge 
resolving a future challenge to the DACA program.  
This decision took control of a pell-mell situation and 
provided Congress—the branch of government charged 
with determining immigration policy—an opportunity to 
remedy it.  Given the reasonable belief that DACA was 
unlawful, the decision to wind down DACA in an orderly 
manner was rational.    
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ APA claims 
to lack merit; the rescission of DACA neither required 
notice-and-comment procedures, nor was it decided ar-
bitrarily or capriciously.   
d. Equal Protection  
Equal protection is the legal mechanism by which 
the law prevents disparate treatment between groups.  
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
                                                 
25 See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 42-228.    
26 See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 238-40.    
27 See Admin. R., ECF No. 26-1 at 251.    
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432, 439 (1985).  A violative statute or action may pro-
vide for disparate treatment facially or in its application.  
See id. at 447-48.  In reviewing legislation, which cre-
ates disparate impacts ‘as applied,’ courts review whether 
the action is covertly based on a suspect classification or 
if it can be plausibly explained on neutral grounds.  See 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).  Probative considerations in-
clude a history of hostility towards the group, the se-
quence of events leading to the government action, de-
partures from previous policies, and the legislative his-
tory.  See id. at 265-67.  The level of judicial scrutiny 
depends on the nature of the class targeted for disparate 
treatment.    
The Complaint asserts that strict scrutiny should ap-
ply because the disparate treatment allegedly involves 
suspect classes—race, alienage, and national origin.  
See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 84 (1979) 
(finding alienage as a suspect class).  When strict scru-
tiny applies, the government has the burden to demon-
strate a compelling state interest, for which the govern-
mental action is narrowly tailored and the least restric-
tive means.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
570 U.S. 297, 308 (2013). 
The Government’s equal protection argument analo-
gizes the rescission of DACA to “selective prosecution” 
—which is afforded a presumption of non-discriminatory 
motives absent “clear evidence to the contrary.”  See 
ECF No. 27-1 at 58-61 (citing United States v. Arm-
strong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-68 (1996) where the court de-
nied discovery on a selective prosecution claim regard-
ing 24 drug-trafficking offenses (all of which were against 
African-American defendants)).  Plaintiffs correctly note 
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that the Armstrong court accepted the proposition that 
“the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on 
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other 
arbitrary classification.”  Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 
(1996).  Plaintiffs aver that the DACA rescission was “a 
discriminatory policy decision (not a challenge to a par-
ticular prosecution) that has a discriminatory impact 
and was motivated by discriminatory animus.”  See ECF 
No. 29 at 55 (noting that Hispanics comprise 93 percent 
of the 800,000 immigrants affected by DACA).  To sub-
stantiate their claim, Plaintiffs cite to some of President 
Trump’s unfortunate, less-than-politically-correct, state-
ments.  See ECF No. 29 at 54.    
Both sides miss the mark.  While DACA was prom-
ulgated under a theory of prosecutorial discretion, its 
rescission was not based on an exercise of that discre-
tion.  Rather, its rescission was premised on a legiti-
mate belief that DACA was unlawful and should be 
wound down in an orderly manner, while giving Con-
gress a window to act and adopt an appropriate legisla-
tive solution.  The Administrative Record—the basis 
from which the Court must make its judicial review—
does not support the notion that it was targeting a sub-
set of the immigrant population, and it does not support 
any supposition that the decision was derived on a racial 
animus.  That is where the judicial inquiry should end.    
The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Presi-
dent’s misguided, inconsistent, and occasionally irra-
tional comments made to the media to establish an  
ulterior motive.  See generally Kleindienst v. Mandel,  
408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (finding that courts should defer 
to any “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for ex-
ecutive action and not “look behind the exercise of that 
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discretion”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 623-24 
n.52 (2006) (noting that courts have never, “in evaluating 
the legality of executive action, deferred to comments 
made by such officials to the media”); County of 
McCreary v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 845 
(2005) (warning courts, albeit in the context of the First 
Amendment, to refrain from “scrutinizing purpose” 
when it requires “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s 
heart of hearts”).28  
Although the DACA Rescission Memo is facially 
clear as to its purpose and reasoning, Plaintiffs urge the 
Court to look behind it and find an allegedly discrimina-
tory motivation—one that Plaintiffs attempt to establish 
with some of the President’s remarks and statements. 
However, Plaintiffs here fail to make the necessary fac-
tual showing to permit this Court to do so.  Albeit in 
the context of an Establishment Clause challenge, the 
Fourth Circuit recently explained in the “travel ban” 
case that there is “a heavy burden on Plaintiffs, but not 
                                                 
28 See also Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-2231, 
2018 WL 894413, at *102 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (Niemeyer, J., dis-
senting):  
Because of their nature, campaign statements and other similar 
statements, including Tweets, are unbounded resources by 
which to find intent of various kinds.  They are often short-hand 
for larger ideas; they are explained, modified, retracted, and am-
plified as they are repeated and as new circumstances and argu-
ments arise.  And they are often susceptible to multiple inter-
pretations, depending on the outlook of the recipient.  . . .  At 
bottom, the danger of this new rule is that it will enable a court 
to justify its decision to strike down any executive action with 
which it disagrees.  It need only find one statement that contra-
dicts the official reasons given for a subsequent executive action 
and thereby pronounce that the official reasons were a pretext.  
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an insurmountable one [in seeking to introduce such 
statements].  [Precedent] clearly affords the political 
branches substantial deference,” but “also accounts for 
those very rare instances in which a challenger plausibly 
alleges that a government action runs so contrary to the 
basic premises of our Constitution as to warrant more 
probing review.”  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, No. 17-2231, 2018 WL 894413, at *12 (4th Cir. 
Feb. 15, 2018) (reviewing the standard set forth in 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) “through the 
lens of Justice Kennedy’s [concurring] opinion in” Kerry 
v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)).    
 In that case, Chief Judge Gregory, writing for the 
majority, explained that Mandel requires courts to 
“first ask whether the proffered reason for the Procla-
mation is ‘facially legitimate and bona fide.’  ”  Id. (cit-
ing Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770).  Under Din, however, a 
district court “may ‘look behind’ the Government’s prof-
fered justification for its action” upon “an ‘affirmative 
showing of bad faith,’ which [plaintiffs] must ‘plausibly 
allege with sufficient particularity.’  ”  Id. (citing Din, 
135 S. Ct. at 2139-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  How-
ever, while the plaintiffs in the “travel ban” case offered 
“undisputed evidence” of an “anti-Muslim bias,” see id. 
at *13, the Plaintiffs cannot here make a similarly sub-
stantial showing.  The Fourth Circuit found that then-
candidate Trump regularly disparaged Islam as a reli-
gion and repeatedly proposed banning Muslims from the 
United States.  See id. at *13-*16.  Implicit to the is-
sue was a direct nexus between the discriminatory state-
ments and the executive action in question in that case—
a travel ban targeting predominantly Muslim nations.    
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The instant case is factually very different.  The 
President certainly made statements of his strong views 
on immigration policy, including advocacy for the rescis-
sion of the DACA program.29  However, his statements 
have frequently shifted but have moderated since his 
election.  He has referred to the Dreamers as “terrific 
people;” he has pledged to “show great heart;” and he 
has referred to Dreamers as “incredible kids.”30  He re-
ferred to the “DACA situation” as a “very difficult thing 
for me.  Because, you know, I love these kids.”31  He 
added that “the existing law is very rough.  It’s very, 
very rough.”32    
The rescission of the DACA program merely fulfills 
the duty of the executive branch to faithfully enforce the 
laws passed by Congress.  Accordingly, no affirmative 
showing of bad faith can follow.  In fact, the President 
actually urged Congress to pass Dreamer-protection 
legislation during DACA’s wind down period33—simply 
put, this case is wholly dissimilar to the “extraordinary 
case” regarding the recent “travel ban.”34  As a result, 
                                                 
29 See Gregory Krieg, Trump’s many shifting positions on DACA, 
from the campaign to right now, CNN (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www. 
cnn.com/2018/01/25/politics/donald-trump-positions-daca/index.html. 
30 See id.    
31 See id.    
32 See id.    
33 See supra Note 15.    
34 Accord Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-2231, 
2018 WL 894413, at *13 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (“In the extraordi-
nary case before us, resolution of that question [regarding pretext] 
presents little difficulty.  Unlike Din and Mandel, in which the Gov-
ernment had a “bona fide factual basis” for its actions, Din, 135 S. Ct. 
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the Court need not go further than the facially legiti-
mate motivation offered in the DACA Rescission Memo 
and supported by the Administrative Record.    
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ equal protec-
tion claims to lack merit  
e. Procedural Due Process  
Procedural due process ensures that the government 
must satisfy certain procedures prior to depriving a  
person of his or her rights.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).  Procedural due process 
applies whenever the government seeks to deprive a 
person of a liberty or property interest.  See id.  Liberty 
interests include physical restraint, a substantial in-
fringement of a fundamental right, harm to one’s repu-
tation affecting another tangible interest, or the unjus-
tified intrusion of one’s personal security.  See, e.g., Vi-
tek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980).  Property inter-
ests include real property, personal property, intellec-
tual property, or any legitimate claim of entitlement.  
See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 
429 (1982).  Entitlements—rights to things like educa-
tion, public employment, and welfare—are grounded in 
the law and cannot be removed except for cause.  See id.  
In determining the amount of process owed, courts bal-
ance (1) the importance of the right the individual is try-
ing to preserve, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
that right given the existing level of due process, and  
(3) the level of governmental burden for the additional 
                                                 
at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), here the Govern-
ment’s proffered rationale for the Proclamation lies at odds with the 
statements of the President himself.”).    
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levels of due process sought.  See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 
334-35. 
Plaintiffs allege that under DACA, Dreamers were 
afforded, and are now being deprived of, a number of 
protected interests, including the ability to (1) obtain 
employment authorization, (2) travel internationally,  
(3) attend schools, (4) pay into and receive payment from 
Social Security and disability, (5) secure other opportu-
nities like obtaining bank accounts or credit cards, and 
(6) otherwise be considered “lawfully present.”  See 
ECF No. 29 at 58.    
First, Plaintiffs’ claim fails because procedural due 
process only applies to individualized deprivations, not 
policy-based deprivations for an entire class.  See Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 
441, 445 (1915) (holding that individualized hearings are 
unnecessary when impractical and when the challenged 
policy affects a large number of people; in these in-
stances, the political process serves as an effective alter-
native).    
Second, even assuming arguendo that due process 
did attach to class-wide policy deprivations, Plaintiffs’ 
due process claim would fail because DACA did not cre-
ate an entitlement.  Facially, the June 15, 2012 DACA 
Memo explicitly denied the creation of any such rights:    
This memorandum confers no substantive right, im-
migration status or pathway to citizenship.  Only 
the Congress, acting through its legislative author-
ity, can confer these rights.  It remains for the ex-
ecutive branch, however, to set forth policy for the 
exercise of discretion within the framework of the ex-
isting law.  I have done so here.    
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Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exer-
cising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individ-
uals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 
15, 2012).    
While entitlements are not always self-labeled or 
created with bright flashing lights, the exercise or re-
straint of prosecutorial discretion is not traditionally the 
sort of governmental action that creates substantive 
rights.  The DACA Memo did not guarantee any indi-
vidual immigrant particular benefits, and the DACA Re-
scission Memo did not curtail DHS’s discretion regard-
ing individual immigration reviews.  Therefore, even if 
due process could attach to DACA, no de facto entitle-
ments were created by the program itself.     
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ procedural 
due process claim to lack merit.  
f. Substantive Due Process  
While procedural due process outlines the manner 
by which the government may deprive a person of his or 
her rights, substantive due process bars the government 
from depriving a person of a right altogether.  See, e.g., 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J., 
concurring).  If the right being deprived is a “fundamen-
tal right,” courts apply strict scrutiny; if the right being 
deprived is not fundamental, courts apply rational basis.   
Certain rights have been adjudicated formally as 
fundamental (right to associate, right to educate one’s 
children, right to procreate, right to marry, etc.).  E.g., 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965).  
In determining whether a non-previously-adjudicated 
right is fundamental, courts have applied different  
approaches—whether the absence of the right would 
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make other fundamental rights “less secure,” see id. at 
482-83, whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Na-
tion’s history and tradition,” see Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City 
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)), and whether 
the right is a basic value “implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty,” see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (quot-
ing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).    
In the instant case, Plaintiffs claim a “denial of fun-
damental fairness.”  See ECF No. 29 at 63-64.  How-
ever, for the “denial of fundamental fairness” to rise to 
the level of a substantive due process violation, it must 
be “so egregious” and “so outrageous” as “to shock the 
contemporary conscience.”  See Manion v. N. Carolina 
Med. Bd., 693 F. App’x 178, 181 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8, 
850 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)).  Plaintiffs believe they have 
met this burden by alleging a discriminatory intent in 
DACA’s rescission—an allegation unsupported by the 
record before this Court.    
The rescission of a policy relating to prosecutorial 
discretion does not shock the conscience of this Court.  
Absent congressional action, the benefits given to Dream-
ers by DACA were in potential violation of congressional 
immigration laws; the only thing that has changed is 
that deferred status will expire, and enforcement of im-
migration laws may recommence in the absence of action 
by Congress, which the President has requested.  There 
is nothing surprising or unfair about policies, laws, or 
enforcement thereof changing with an election cycle.  
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Furthermore, the election process, and not federal liti-
gation, is the appropriate method for resolving any fair-
ness implicated in DACA’s rescission.    
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ substantive 
due process claim to lack merit.  
g. Estoppel  
The doctrine of estoppel is traditionally founded in 
the principles of fraud as applied in contract law, but  
the doctrine may be applied elsewhere in the law as  
well.  See generally W. Augusta Dev. Corp. v. Giuffrida,  
717 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing the out-
growth of the doctrine of estoppel as a claim against the 
government).  In general, “equitable estoppel is com-
prised of three basic elements:  (1) a voluntary misrep-
resentation of one party, (2) that is relied on by the other 
party, (3) to the other party’s detriment.”  Chawla v. 
Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 440 F.3d 639, 
646 (4th Cir. 2006).  In this Circuit, when raising such a 
claim against the government, there is a heightened stand-
ard for the first element, and an additional showing of 
“affirmative misconduct” by the government actors.  
See Dawkins v. Witt, 318 F.3d 606, 611 (4th Cir. 2003).    
As with Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, es-
toppel cannot apply to DACA’s rescission.  The rescis-
sion of a policy relating to prosecutorial discretion does 
not amount to a misrepresentation by the government.  
DACA was promulgated with an express disclaimer that 
it was not conferring any rights.  Nothing in the DACA 
Memo or in DACA’s implementation suggested to 
Dreamers that the program was permanent, and indi-
viduals in the program were aware that their protections 
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were subject to renewal every two years.  DACA’s re-
scission lacks any serious injustice—let alone, affirma-
tive misconduct by any of the defendants.     
However, while estoppel does not apply to DACA’s 
rescission, it potentially would apply to any use for im-
migration enforcement of the information collected from 
Dreamers during DACA registrations.  With regard to 
this narrow issue, and based on the evidence before it, 
the Court finds that the Government promised not to 
transfer or use the information gathered from Dream-
ers for immigration enforcement.  See ECF No. 29 at 
42-44, 60-61; ECF No. 29-3 at 15-27, 32-41, 52-76, 96-98, 
109-13.  And now that the government is in possession 
of this information, the potential for use or sharing of it 
is theoretically possible.    
On the one hand, the Government claims that no 
changes have been made to the information-sharing pol-
icy.  However, at oral argument, counsel for the Gov-
ernment was unable to provide any assurance that the 
Government would not make changes.    
[Mr. Shumate:] The rescission policy that is being 
challenged here says nothing about the sharing of in-
formation for enforcement purposes.  There’s noth-
ing more that the plaintiffs have raised other than a 
speculative fear that this might happen in the future.  
But DHS has been quite clear and they said on the 
FAQ section— 
The Court:  Are you prepared to say that from rep-
resenting the defendants that there is no intention of 
changing the information-sharing assurances that 
were given in connection with DACA?  
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Mr. Shumate:  No.  I’m not making that represen-
tation, Your Honor.  Even from the beginning, DHS 
has been quite clear that this policy on information-
sharing can change.  . . .  But they also I think 
take liberties with what that policy is.  There has 
never been a promise or assurance that that infor-
mation would never be changed.  FAQ 19 quite 
clearly says that the information is generally pro-
tected and will not be shared for enforcement pur-
poses, but there may be circumstances where it will 
be to adjudicate a DACA application or for law en-
forcement purposes if the individual meets the status 
of the test for notice to appear.  But also quite 
clearly, DHS has said from the start that the infor-
mation policy—sharing policy can change, but it has 
not.  So that really should be the end of the debate 
about the information-sharing.    
Tr. of Mot. Hr’g (Dec. 15, 2017) at 16-17.    
The Court disagrees that this “should be the end of 
the debate about the information-sharing.”  Id.  Logic 
would dictate that it is possible that the government, 
having induced these immigrants to share their personal 
information under the guise of immigration protections, 
could now use that same information to track and re-
move them.  This potentially would be “affirmative mis-
conduct” by the government, and the Dreamers’ detri-
mental reliance would be self-evident in the information-
sharing itself.    
Therefore, while the Government will not be enjoined 
from rescinding DACA, given the substantial risk for ir-
reparable harm in using Dreamers’ DACA-provided in-
formation, the Court will enjoin the Government from 
using information provided by Dreamers through the 
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DACA program for enforcement purposes.  In the event 
that the Government needs to make use of an individual 
Dreamer’s information for national security or some 
purpose implicating public safety or public interest, the 
Government may petition the Court for permission to do 
so on a case-by-case basis with in camera review.    
IV. CONCLUSION  
In concluding this Opinion, the Court notes the re-
cent opinion of Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel, of the Southern 
District of California, in which he made observations 
that aptly apply to this case.  In a case involving a chal-
lenge to President Trump’s proposed “border wall,” he 
noted that the case was “currently the subject of heated 
political debate,” but that in its review of the case, “the 
Court cannot and does not consider whether underlying 
decisions  . . .  are politically wise or prudent.”  In 
re Border Infrastructure Envtl. Litig., No. CV 17-1215 
GPC (WVG), 2018 WL 1071702, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 
2018).  For this proposition, he cited the opinion of his 
fellow Indiana native, Chief Justice Roberts, in Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012):  
“Court[s] are vested with the authority to interpret the 
law; we possess neither the expertise nor the preroga-
tive to make policy judgments.  Those decisions are en-
trusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be 
thrown out of office if the people disagree with them.  
It is not our job to protect the people from the conse-
quences of their political choices.”    
The result of this case is not one that this Court 
would choose if it were a member of a different branch 
of our government.  An overwhelming percentage of 
Americans support protections for “Dreamers,” yet it is 
not the province of the judiciary to provide legislative or 
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executive actions when those entrusted with those re-
sponsibilities fail to act.  As Justice Gorsuch noted dur-
ing his confirmation hearing, “a judge who likes every 
outcome he reaches is probably a pretty bad judge, 
stretching for the policy results he prefers rather than 
those the law compels.”35    
This Court does not like the outcome of this case, but 
is constrained by its constitutionally limited role to the 
result that it has reached.  Hopefully, the Congress 
and the President will finally get their job done.     
Date:  Mar. 5, 2018     
       /s/                                      
ROGER W. TITUS 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
                                                 
35  Neil Gorsuch, Transcript of Opening Remarks at Confirma- 
tion Hearing, Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www. 
judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/03-20-17%20Gorsuch%20Testimony. 
pdf.    
